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In this Article Professor Sullivan examines the Supreme Court’s evolving Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence through its dramatic return to pre-Sixth Amendment appreciation of the role of crossexamination in the criminal trial reflected in its 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington. He
discusses the past quarter century of the Court’s confrontation decisions and their impact on his
client, Ralph Rodney Earnest, recounting the defendant’s conviction and twenty-four-year litigation
journey through state and federal courts to his eventual release from prison in the only successful
attempt to use Crawford retroactively known to date.


Judge George Howard, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of
Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. This Article is based on the author‘s representation of
New Mexico defendant Ralph Rodney Earnest from Earnest‘s direct appeal in 1984 through
dismissal of murder charges resulting in his release from custody on September 5, 2006. Mr.
Earnest‘s imprisonment for some twenty-four years reflects both the flexibility of judicial review as a
vehicle for reassessing legal doctrine and the frustration experienced by individual litigants who
often suffer significant deprivation of liberty during the process of judicial retrospection. I want to
acknowledge the fine work of the New Mexico lawyers with whom I worked on behalf of Mr.
Earnest throughout this lengthy litigation: Gary C. Mitchell of Ruidoso, New Mexico, Earnest‘s trial
counsel, who preserved error and in so doing, ultimately made his release possible, and who
successfully argued his Crawford-based application for state post-conviction relief in the Eddy
County District Court; Susan Gibbs, who served as local counsel on direct appea l and later, in federal
habeas proceedings, after I left the New Mexico Public Defender Department; and Assistant Public
Defender Sheila Lewis, who served as local appellate counsel in the state post-conviction process.
The case against Mr. Earnest was dismissed by the district court in Carlsbad, New Mexico, when the
defense announced it was ready for trial on September 5, 2006, and the State admitted that it could
not proceed due to the refusal of the key prosecution witness to testify, resulting in the immediate
release of Earnest from custody. I also want to acknowledge the excellent editing assistance
provided by Molly K. Sullivan, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Bowen School of Law, J.D.
anticipated 2009.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Algernon: The truth is rarely pure and never simple. Modern
life would be very tedious if it were either, and modern
literature a complete impossibility!
Jack: That wouldn‘t be at all a bad thing.
The Importance of Being Earnest, Act I 1
The United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Crawford v. Washington
represents a rare exercise in appellate decision making because Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, concluded that the Court had erred in previous
decisions.2 He explained: ―[W]e view this as one of those rare cases in which
the result below is so improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure on our
part to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint
on judicial discretion.‖3 The Crawford Court held that the admission of a
testimonial statement made by a non-testifying accomplice violates the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause4 in the absence of a meaningful
opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the declarant.5 The Crawford
Court rejected alternative theories for admission of these statements without
cross-examination despite their presumed inherent reliability. 6 Moreover, the
Court‘s rationale also resulted in the exclusion of certain uncrossed hearsay in

1. OSCAR WILDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST, reprinted in EIGHT GREAT
COMEDIES 286, 295 (1958).
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides that ―[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.‖ Id.
5. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (―Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium
of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.‖) (emphasis added).
6. See id. at 57. The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized and applied Crawford in State v.
Johnson, 98 P.3d 998, 1011 n.1 (N.M. 2004).
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contexts other than accomplice admissions to police, 7 significantly altering the
scope of traditional Confrontation Clause analysis.
For at least one state court defendant, Ralph Rodney Earnest, Crawford
was particularly significant because it afforded him relief from a murder
conviction and a sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty-one and one-half
years imposed nearly a quarter of a century earlier. 8 When the New Mexico
7. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 n.4, 826–32 (2006) (holding that a statement
made by the victim while seeking aid was not testimonial while a statement after the fact was
testimonial); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an autopsy report
was a ―business record,‖ not testimony); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 138–40 (Cal. 2007) (finding
that a DNA report was not testimonial); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 841 (Md. 2006)
(distinguishing between statements of ―fact‖ and statements of ―opinion‖ in autopsy reports and
ruling that the latter were testimonial but the former were not); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d
701, 703 (Mass. 2005) (holding that a certificate of lab analysis identifying the nature and quantity of
substance was not testimonial); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Minn. 2006) (holding
that a report containing laboratory test analysis was ―testimonial‖ and inadmissible without
opportunity to cross-examine the analyst); State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 639 (N.M. 2004) (holding
admission of record does not require opportunity for in-court cross-examination of expert who
conducted test); State v. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d 679, 685 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (same); People v.
Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that an autopsy report was a ―business
record,‖ not testimony); and State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C. 2006) (holding that a police
lab‘s report of DNA analysis was a ―neutral‖ business record).
The issue of application of Crawford to admission of laboratory test reports not offered through
the expert who conducted the test is before the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts. 69 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 (2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-591 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2007), 2007 WL 3252033.
Melendez-Diaz was argued in November 2008. Transcript of Oral Argument, Melendez-Diaz, No.
07-591.
Crawford also opened the door to extensive litigation of confrontation claims within individual
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Dednam v. State, 200 S.W.3d 875, 880–81 (Ark. 2005) (holding no
confrontation violation where a statement purportedly made by the murder victim to an officer
concerning another offense was not offered for proof of matter asserted but to show a possible
motive for the killing); Brown v. State, 238 S.W.3d 614, 618–19 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (finding no
confrontation violation when a child declarant was present at trial and subjected to cross-examination
regarding the subject of a videotaped deposition); Simmons v. State, 234 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2006) (finding prior deposition testimony elicited in anticipation of civil trial was ―testimonial,‖
counsel had opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at deposition with an identical motive for
cross at trial, and the witness‘s death rendered him unavailable, thus no error in admission of
deposition testimony); Bogan v. State, No. CACR 05-892, 2006 WL 557128, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 2006) (finding a confrontation claim moot where the appellant did not challenge on appeal
alternative ground supporting revocation of probation); Wooten v. State, 217 S.W.3d 124, 126–27
(Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (finding no confrontation violation where a statement was not offered for the
truth); Sparkman v. State, 208 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (finding a confrontation
violation in admission of a videotaped statement harmless in light of accused‘s own admission to an
investigating officer); Vallien v. State, No. CACR 04-985, 2005 WL 2865183, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App.
Nov. 2, 2005) (holding confrontation violation harmless); Hilburn v. State, No. CACR 04-295, 2005
WL 419499, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2005) (finding no violation where the statement was not
offered for the truth, but error not preserved).
8. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005), cert. denied, New Mexico v.
Forbes, 127 S. Ct. 1482 (2007) (The Honorable Jay Forbes was the district judge who ordered habeas
relief; the New Mexico attorney general directed its extraordinary writ at the presiding judge, with
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Supreme Court fashioned a rule affording Earnest relief from that conviction
based on a limited retroactive application of Crawford,9 the court‘s decision
invariably raised important questions about the retroactivity of United States
Supreme Court decisions bearing directly on the accuracy of the fact-finding
process.
In the Court‘s subsequent decision in Whorton v. Bockting,10 which
unanimously denied retroactive application of its Crawford holding, 11 the
Court held to its bright-line approach to retroactivity imposed in Teague v.
Lane.12 There, a plurality of the Court13 had determined that ―new rules‖ of
constitutional criminal procedure14 are subject to retroactive application to
cases already final only under certain limited circumstances. 15 Cases are final
when the defendant has exhausted the direct appeal process through denial of
a petition for writ of certiorari by the Court.16 But cases still pending review
in the direct appeal process, including consideration of certiorari, are entitled
to retroactive application of the new rule and its benefits, provided the issue

Earnest being the real party in interest in the case.).
9. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 148–49.
10. 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
11. Id. at 1177.
12. 489 U.S. 288, 300–01 (1989).
13. Justice O‘Connor wrote the opinion for a plurality of the Court. Justice White concurred in
Parts I, II, and III of the opinion and in the judgment. Id. at 316 (White, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and in the judgment, id. at 318 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring), while also concurring in part in a separate opinion written by Justice Stevens, id.
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens specifically noted his agreement with a critical part of
Justice Brennan‘s dissenting opinion, id. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring), in which Justice Marshall
joined. Justice Brennan was especially critical of the Court‘s disposition of the case without oral
argument and full briefing on the dispositive point. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is
somewhat difficult to explain how a thinly supported new rule could dominate the Court‘s
subsequent jurisprudence with respect to the very critical importance of ―new rules‖ in the
development of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine and for disposition of claims raised by
individual litigants.
14. The new rules doctrine does not apply to interpretation of constitutional protections
regarding substantive rights. For example, the doctrine does not affect a determination that a statute
is facially unconstitutional, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453–55 (1939) (holding the
statute so vague as to fail to afford notice of conduct criminalized); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926), or that a statute is unconstitutionally applied, see United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68–69 (1994) (holding the statute would constitute a matter of
substance, not procedure, and thus would not be restricted in its retroactive application). Similarly, a
determination that a criminal prosecution infringes on a protected right of expression would involve a
substantive, not procedural, determination. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971)
(involving a conviction based on lewd inscription on clothing protesting the draft).
15. See infra Part IV.A.1 for a discussion of exceptions to the Teague retroactivity doctrine.
16. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (―By ‗final,‘ we mean a case in
which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time
for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.‖).
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has been properly preserved, consistent with the Court‘s subsequent position
in Griffith v. Kentucky.17
The Crawford and Bockting litigation also led to an important, previously
unresolved question of federalism that the Court has now addressed in
Danforth v. Minnesota18 regarding the extent to which state courts are at
liberty to apply federal constitutional precedent more broadly than required by
federal due process protections as mandated by the Teague doctrine. 19 Thus
far, the New Mexico Supreme Court has been the only state court to fashion a
retroactive remedy based on Crawford. And Earnest appears to have been the
only convicted defendant to have benefited from the Court‘s changed posture
on confrontation. 20
II. THE CONFRONTATION CONTEXT OF EARNEST
Had the New Mexico Supreme Court denied relief on Earnest‘s claim for
the retroactive benefit of Crawford, the case would have served as little more
than a footnote in the history of Confrontation Clause litigation. The Earnest
litigation raised the question now answered by Danforth, upholding the
autonomy of state courts to fashion remedies for state defendants based on
newly announced federal constitutional principles. And, given the emphasis
on pre-constitutional and constitutional history in Justice Scalia‘s analysis of
the confrontation claim in Crawford, the little noticed role of Earnest in that
history deserves mention.
The Earnest litigation was lengthy. It included two trials, direct appeal in
the state court,21 argument and reversal on the confrontation issue in the
United States Supreme Court,22 and remand to the state supreme court.23
State24 and federal habeas corpus litigation finally concluded some nine years

17. Teague, 489 U.S. at 304–05; Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322–23.
18. 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008).
19. In Danforth, the Court granted certiorari limited to Question I in the Petition, relating to the
power of state courts to apply federal constitutional criminal procedure holdings retroactively to state
inmates or whether they are bound to follow the federal retroactivity doctrine of Teague. Danforth v.
Minnesota, 127 S. Ct. 2427 (2007) (granting certiorari in Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451 (Minn.
2006)). In deciding that Teague does not limit retroactive application of its decisions by state courts,
the Danforth Court noted the plurality opinion issued in Teague but further observed that Justice
O‘Connor‘s approach in Teague was subsequently affirmed by a majority of the Court in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1032 n.1.
20. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005).
21. See State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872 (N.M. 1985).
22. See New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986).
23. See State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987), cert. denied, Earnest v. New
Mexico, 484 U.S. 924 (1987).
24. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct.
July 9, 1990).
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before Crawford changed the legal landscape favorably for Earnest‘s case. 25
To appreciate the significance of Crawford and the question of its retroactive
application for Earnest, now resolved adversely as a matter of federal
constitutional due process in Bockting,26 it is necessary to understand the
history of the Earnest litigation.
A. The Offense and the Prosecution
Earnest was charged with two co-defendants, Perry Connor and Philip
Boeglin, in the capital murder of David Eastman in 1982 in Carlsbad, Eddy
County, New Mexico.27 There was no eyewitness to the offense, other than
Boeglin and Connor.28 Connor ultimately testified that Earnest was not
involved in the murder of Eastman and that he and Boeglin had killed him as
a result of their belief that Eastman was a drug informant. 29
Following the discovery of Eastman‘s body, police were alerted that three
potential suspects had been observed in Eastman‘s El Camino on the morning
following his murder.30 Police arrested the three, and Boeglin proceeded to
give a series of statements to investigators on the day of the arrest, one of
which jointly implicated him, Connor, and another individual he identified as
―Rob‖ or ―Rod‖ in the commission of Eastman‘s murder. 31 In the absence of
Boeglin‘s statement and the inference that the other individual referred to was
in fact Earnest, there was no evidence that Earnest had participated in the
murder and kidnapping offenses.

25. See generally Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Earnest v.
Dorsey, 519 U.S. 1016 (1996).
26. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1181 (2007).
27. Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1127; State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 873 (N.M. 1985).
28. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 145 (N.M. 2005).
29. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Earnest v. State, CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct.
Oct. 1, 2004); see also State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987). ―There was no
physical evidence in the form of fingerprints, blood, or DNA linking Earnest to the murder, even
though police recovered a handgun used in the killing and the victim was also beaten, which
suggested the possible splatter of blood onto his assailants.‖ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
supra, at 6; see also Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1134.
The State‘s brief accurately summarizes the circumstantial evidence that was
offered at the second trial. (N.M. Br. 5–7). It fails to note, however, (i) that
Earnest‘s fingerprints were not found on the murder weapon or at the crime
scene and (ii) that a nitrate test on Earnest‘s hands for gunshot residue was
negative.
Brief for the ACLU & the ACLU of N.M. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11
n.9, New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (No. 85-162).
30. Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1134.
31. Id. at 1127, 1134 & n.8.
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The three co-defendants were charged with first-degree murder,
conspiracy to commit murder, aggravated kidnapping, and conspiracy to
commit kidnapping. 32
Because the prosecution could have alleged
aggravating circumstances, the murder charge carried a potential death
sentence. Earnest was also charged with possession of methamphetamine. 33
Connor pleaded guilty in return for a life sentence. 34 The cases against
Earnest and Boeglin were severed for trial, and Earnest‘s first trial on the
charges was terminated by mistrial when Boeglin refused to testify as a
witness for the State after being granted use immunity for his testimony. 35
B. Conviction, Preservation of Error, and the Direct Appeal
At Earnest‘s second trial, Boeglin again refused to testify.36 The trial
court found that Boeglin was unavailable based on his refusal to testify even
under grant of immunity and threat of contempt. 37 Based on this finding of
unavailability, the trial court admitted Boeglin‘s jointly inculpatory statement
in evidence over Earnest‘s objection. 38 Earnest was convicted on all counts
and appealed his convictions to the New Mexico Supreme Court.39
Earnest‘s claim on direct appeal rested on the issue of whether his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the admission of Boeglin‘s
statement, or whether Boeglin‘s unavailability rendered his statement
admissible despite the absence of any opportunity for Earnest to test Boeglin‘s
credibility and the accuracy of the statement through cross-examination. 40
1. Confrontation as Cross-Examination: Douglas v. Alabama
The Sixth Amendment confrontation right was first made expressly
applicable in the context of state prosecutions in Pointer v. Texas.41 Pointer
involved the question of admission of sworn, prior testimony given during a
32. Id. at 1127.
33. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 873 (N.M. 1985).
34. Petitioner‘s Brief on the Merits at 12, New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (No.
85-162).
35. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 874–75.
36. Id. at 875.
37. Id. Boeglin was sentenced to a total term of twenty-six years for contempt. State v.
Boeglin, 686 P.2d 257, 257–59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). His contempt conviction was subsequently
vacated by the New Mexico Court of Appeals. Id.
38. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 875. Boeglin was later tried and convicted despite his testimony that
police had suppressed evidence supporting his defense of duress in participating in the murder of the
victim, Eastman. See State v. Boeglin, 731 P.2d 943, 950 (N.M. 1987).
39. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 873; see also State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th. Jud. Dist.
Ct. Sept. 19, 1983) (judgment, sentence, and commitment).
40. See Earnest I, 703 P.2d. at 873–74.
41. 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
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preliminary hearing, at which time the accused presumably had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness but without assistance of counsel. 42
The Pointer Court rested its holding on existence of an ―adequate
opportunity‖ for cross-examination.43 Without assistance of counsel, Pointer
did not have that opportunity, and admission of the witness‘s prior testimony
at trial was inappropriate in the absence of live testimony and the opportunity
for cross-examination before the jury. Consequently, the Court grounded its
confrontation analysis in the existence of a meaningful opportunity for crossexamination for the accused at some point in the criminal proceedings. 44
On the same day it held in Pointer that the Sixth Amendment
confrontation protection applied to state proceedings in Pointer, the Court
also considered the nature of confrontation in Douglas v. Alabama.45 The
constitutional preference for cross-examination was unequivocally
demonstrated in Douglas when the Court rejected the prosecutor‘s use of an
accomplice‘s statement as a basis for cross-examining the declarant, who had
refused to testify at trial.46 The prosecutor had simply read the statement
before the jury over defense counsel‘s objection, asking the uncooperative
witness to affirm each portion of its contents.47 The prosecutor then called
three law enforcement officers to testify that the statement was in fact made
by the accomplice, but the statement itself was neither offered nor admitted in
evidence. 48 Thus, the prosecutor succeeded in using the statement without the
defense being afforded any meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the
accomplice as to the accuracy of the confession or his credibility. 49
Douglas signified the Court‘s uncompromising view of the constitutional
significance of cross-examination as essential to the confrontation guarantee
until the decision in Ohio v. Roberts,50 issued fifteen years after Douglas.
42. Id. at 403.
43. Id. at 406–08. Subsequent decisions emphasized the meaningful opportunity for crossexamination in the evaluation of admissibility of prior testimony. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204, 213 (1972) (―Before it can be said that Stubbs‘ constitutional right to confront witnesses was not
infringed, however, the adequacy of Holm‘s examination at the first trial must be taken into
consideration.‖) (emphasis added); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165–68 (1970).
44. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407–08.
45. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
46. Id. at 416–17.
47. Id. The Court had long recognized, however, that under certain circumstances the
confrontation right did not necessarily depend upon the opportunity for cross-examination of a
witness who was not available to testify at trial. For instance, in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140 (1892), the Court recognized the common law rule admitting dying declarations as exceptions to
the usual requirement for cross-examination based upon their presumed inherent reliability, being
made under perception of impending death. Id. at 151.
48. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 417.
49. Id. at 419–20.
50. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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2. The Devaluation of Cross-Examination in Ohio v. Roberts
The Court‘s abrupt shift away from recognition of cross-examination as
the heart of confrontation served to accommodate common law evidence
concepts within the Sixth Amendment guarantee. 51 In Ohio v. Roberts, the
majority effectively integrated confrontation and principles underlying the
traditional prohibition against admission of hearsay and, more importantly, its
many exceptions. 52 In so doing, the majority introduced a confrontation
doctrine in which the actual process of confrontation through crossexamination was itself subject to exception when, in the Court‘s view, crossexamination seemed unlikely to afford significant benefit in searching for
truth.53
The factual context of Roberts suggests that the majority unnecessarily
departed from established principles guiding construction of the confrontation
guarantee in fashioning the new doctrine ultimately repudiated in Crawford.
In Roberts, the witness testified at the preliminary hearing, was subjected to
cross-examination, and was shown to be unavailable to testify at trial despite
the prosecution‘s diligent efforts to procure her attendance. 54
Consistent with its traditional holdings, the Court could have simply
reaffirmed the principle that previously cross-examined testimony is generally
admissible when the prosecution cannot reasonably secure the attendance of
the witness for trial.55 Instead, the Court opened the door to admission of
uncrossed hearsay by holding that cross-examination before the jury was not
required if a statement bore sufficient ―indicia of reliability‖ to warrant its
admission.56 The reliability requirement, according to Roberts, was met when
the statement fell within a ―firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ traditionally
recognized as justifying admission or the statement had ―particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.‖57
3. Disposition of the Direct Appeal in the State Supreme Court
On direct appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed Earnest‘s
convictions based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses,58 noting his reliance on the United States Supreme Court‘s decision

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id.
See id. at 66.
See id. at 65–66.
Id. at 58–60.
See id. at 65–66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 875–76 (N.M. 1985).
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in Douglas v. Alabama.59 The court rejected the State‘s argument that
Boeglin‘s statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability for admission without
cross-examination based on the Supreme Court‘s intervening decision in Ohio
v. Roberts.60 In setting aside the defendant‘s conviction in Earnest, the court
affirmed the preference for cross-examination in the presence of the jury at
trial in concluding:
Boeglin‘s prior statement made to police officers shortly after
his arrest was not made during the course of any judicial
proceeding and defendant was in no way afforded an
opportunity to cross-examine Boeglin.
We therefore
determine that admission of Boeglin‘s prior statement was
highly prejudicial, violated defendant‘s confrontation rights,
and deprived defendant of meaningful cross-examination.61
Thus, the court concluded not only that Earnest‘s convictions rested on
constitutional error, but also that the error was prejudicial, requiring
reversal.62 However, the court rejected Earnest‘s prior jeopardy claim based
on the trial court‘s declaration of mistrial when Boeglin refused to testify at
the first trial.63 Instead, because trial counsel had objected to the trial court‘s
aggressive efforts to force Boeglin to testify against his client, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that Earnest had invited the mistrial and thus
could not plead prior jeopardy as a bar to the retrial, despite the trial court‘s
express withdrawal of his mistrial motions. 64
C. New Mexico v. Earnest: The United States Supreme Court Weighs In
Following the reversal of Earnest‘s conviction on direct appeal, the
attorney general successfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari.65 After hearing oral argument, the Court vacated the judgment of
59. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
60. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 876; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The Earnest I
court relied on the Tenth Circuit‘s application of Roberts in United States v. Rothbart, 653 F.2d 462,
465 (10th Cir. 1981), limiting the application of the Roberts rationale to instances in which the
prosecution offered prior testimony that had been subjected to cross-examination, a formulation
correctly anticipating Crawford. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 876.
61. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 876.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 874.
64. See id. (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470, 485 (1971)). The supreme court ruled that counsel was admonished by the trial court that
his motions for mistrial risked termination of proceedings that might otherwise have resulted in
acquittal because of insufficient evidence. Id. The court then concluded that trial counsel failed to
withdraw his motions prior to declaration of a mistrial. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 874–85.
65. New Mexico v. Earnest, 474 U.S. 918 (1985).
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the New Mexico Supreme Court and remanded the case for reconsideration in
light of its just-issued decision in Lee v. Illinois.66 Concurring, then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Powell and
O‘Connor, observed that Lee overruled Douglas v. Alabama by implication, 67
adopting the rationale of Ohio v. Roberts.68 In Roberts, the Court ruled that
the Confrontation Clause does not always require cross-examination at trial by
holding that admission of preliminary hearing testimony subject to crossexamination would be admissible in the event of the declarant‘s unavailability
to testify at trial.69
In Lee, the Court extended the ―indicia of reliability‖ test articulated in
Roberts to include jointly inculpatory statements made by accomplices to
police.70 Thus, Justice Rehnquist observed that after Lee, state courts could
admit statements of non-testifying co-defendants assuming that the
prosecution could ―overcome the weighty presumption of unreliability
attaching to [those] statements by demonstrating that the particular statement
at issue bears sufficient ‗indicia of reliability‘ to satisfy Confrontation Clause
concerns.‖71 But significantly, the Lee majority did not hold that the
accomplice‘s statement was properly admitted, and Lee was afforded relief
from the conviction. 72
On remand from the order vacating its judgment for reconsideration in
light of Lee, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed Earnest‘s
convictions. 73 In so doing, it followed Justice Rehnquist‘s lead and concluded
that Boeglin‘s statement to the police demonstrated sufficient indicia of
reliability to warrant admission despite his unavailability for crossexamination.74 The primary basis for its decision was its characterization of
Boeglin‘s statement as a declaration against his penal interest75 because it
66. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 648 (1986); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
67. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 649–50; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
69. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 68–70. The burden of establishing the unavailability of the witness
must be borne by the prosecution. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722–25 (1968).
70. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 543–44.
71. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649–50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
72. Lee, 476 U.S. at 546–47. The state courts had concluded that the ―interlocking‖ nature of
statements given to police by the defendant and the accomplice rendered the statement sufficiently
reliable to warrant its admission without the accused being afforded an opportunity to test its
credibility by cross-examination. Id. at 538–39. An equally divided Court in Parker v. Randolph,
442 U.S. 62 (1979), had suggested that the interlocking confessions of the accused and co-defendant
avoided the harm of admission of a co-defendant‘s uncrossed confession deemed so prejudicial as to
defy cure by admonition in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968). See Parker, 442 U.S.
at 72–73.
73. State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 541 (N.M. 1987).
74. Id. at 540.
75. Curiously, the court never addressed the text or applicability of the state‘s evidence rule
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exposed him to prosecution for a capital crime and a potential death
sentence. 76
The state court also found that Boeglin‘s statement was reliable because it
was corroborated by evidence of the offense itself, noting:
[T]here was independent evidence presented at trial which
substantially corroborated Boeglin‘s description of events
surrounding the murder. For example: Boeglin‘s description
of a drug deal involving fourteen grams of methamphetamine
was corroborated by Michael Blount; Boeglin‘s description of
the accomplices‘ belief that the victim was an informant was
corroborated by Dana Boeglin; Boeglin‘s description of an
attempt to kill the victim with an overdose of
methamphetamine was corroborated by the testimony of a
toxicologist; and Boeglin‘s description of where the gun used
to kill the victim was hidden led to recovery of the gun. In
sum, Boeglin‘s statement bore sufficient independent indicia
of reliability to rebut the weighty presumption of
unreliability; the trial court therefore did not err in admitting
it into evidence. 77
None of these corroborating facts, however, rendered the statement credible
with regard to allegations concerning the involvement of other individuals,
Connor and ―Rod‖ or ―Rob‖—as Boeglin had identified the other participant
in the crime. 78
Later in Idaho v. Wright,79 the Supreme Court held that where hearsay
statements are admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule and without
opportunity for cross-examination, the ―indicia of reliability‖ justifying
admission may not include evidence corroborating the factual contents of the
governing admission of declarations against penal interest:
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making
so far contrary to the declarant‘s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by the declarant against another that a reasonable person in the declarant‘s
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
N.M. R. EVID. 11-804(B)(3).
76. Earnest II, 744 P.2d at 540.
77. Id.
78. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 n.8 (10th Cir. 1996).
79. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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statement.80 That limitation, as applied to Boeglin‘s statement, is obvious.
Accomplice statements are considered inherently suspect due to the
accomplice‘s self-interest,81 which may be promoted by cooperating with
authorities or, more aggressively, by supplying information sought by
authorities that may not be truthful. 82 The fact that evidence surrounding the
offense corroborated aspects of Boeglin‘s statement merely demonstrated that
he was more than likely involved in the offense himself; it did not
demonstrate Earnest‘s guilt. In Wright, the Court confirmed this approach in
ruling that ―hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia
of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other
evidence at trial.‖83
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the argument that
Boeglin sought leverage from police in giving the inculpatory statement, it
focused on objective factors rather than considering Boeglin‘s state of mind or
apparent motive. 84 The court concluded that his statement was reliable
―because the colloquy between Boeglin and the investigating officers
reflect[ed] the fact that Boeglin was not offered any leniency in exchange for
his statement.‖85 Thus, because officers told Boeglin he could not expect
leniency, the court found that his statement was not motivated by hope of
gaining leniency, something that could never be discerned from the officers‘

80. Id. at 823.
81. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195
(1987) (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that such statements ―have traditionally been viewed with
special suspicion‖); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
136 (1968) (concluding that such statements are ―inevitably suspect‖).
82. A particularly poignant story reflecting the self-interest of a suspect implicating another
individual involves the confession by Christopher Ochoa, who admitted to a rape and murder he did
not commit, and his implication of a friend, Richard Danziger, in the same crime. Diane Jennings, A
Shaken System, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 24, 2008, at 1A. Ochoa was motivated by fear of the
death penalty. Id. Some twelve years after both men were convicted and sentenced to life terms,
they were exonerated by the confession of another individual whose responsibility was corroborated
by DNA evidence. Id. Ochoa testified against Danziger at trial, later admitting that he lied under
oath in order to obtain the life sentence promised in return for his own plea of guilty. Id. Both men
were ultimately released on the basis of the true killer‘s confession made in a letter to the Travis
County, Texas, district attorney and the recovery of DNA evidence demonstrating that this
confession was accurate. Id. Ochoa completed his education, including graduating from the
University of Wisconsin School of Law, the institution whose Innocence Project had championed the
case, and now practices criminal law. Id. Danziger, however, was assaulted in prison, suffering a
severe brain injury that has left him permanently impaired and living with assistance paid for from
the settlement of his civil suit against the City of Austin and Travis County. Id.
83. 497 U.S. at 822.
84. See State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987).
85. Id.
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statements to the contrary since it involved Boeglin‘s perception rather than
objective facts.86
Indeed, before giving the inculpatory statement, Boeglin explained to the
detectives: ―I was hoping I could make some kind of deal.‖ 87 At this point,
the detectives advised that they would not offer him any deal for his
cooperation. 88 Based on objective facts, the court concluded that Boeglin had
no reasonable expectation of ―mak[ing] some kind of deal‖ with officers. 89
But the critical issue in determining the credibility of the statement should not
have been whether Boeglin could have made a deal by cooperating with
authorities, but more accurately, whether he thought he could have. Having
indicated his interest in making a deal, one could question whether there was
any reasonable explanation for his subsequent disclosures since his expression
of interest in making a deal undermined any reasonable inference that he
confessed to expiate guilt.
Nevertheless, the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s factual conclusion was
controlling on this point and binding on subsequent federal habeas corpus
review. 90
D. Earnest in Post-Conviction
Following affirmance of his conviction on remand from the United States
Supreme Court, Earnest turned to state91 and federal avenues 92 for postconviction relief.
1. Earnest‘s State Constitutional Claim in State Habeas Corpus93
Initially, Earnest filed an application for state post-conviction relief,
urging the state courts to consider his claim that Boeglin‘s statement had been
improperly admitted without cross-examination in light of the confrontation
protection afforded by the New Mexico Constitution. 94 This claim had been
included in the original direct appeal but not argued aggressively as an
86. See id.
87. Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Deference to state court fact-finding by federal habeas courts is mandated by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (2000), including facts found by state appellate courts. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539,
545–46 (1981).
91. New Mexico Rule of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts 5-802G currently provides
a state post-conviction remedy for New Mexico inmates challenging their state court convictions.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) creates a statutory federal habeas corpus remedy for state court
inmates claiming violations of federal constitutional rights in state court proceedings.
93. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 24, at 2.
94. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14, cl. 3 (―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .‖).
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alternative ground for relief. 95 The New Mexico Supreme Court‘s reversal of
Earnest‘s conviction based on Douglas rendered the state constitutional
argument moot, of course. 96 Although on remand the court noted the
excellent briefs and oral arguments of both parties, it did not address the state
constitutional claim in its opinion affirming Earnest‘s conviction. 97
In his initial application for state habeas relief, Earnest argued that
because New Mexico courts had traditionally interpreted the state
constitutional confrontation guarantee as coextensive with crossexamination,98 the relaxed standard for Sixth Amendment confrontation
recognized in Ohio v. Roberts would not overcome the state law protection. 99
New Mexico precedent consistently described the right of confrontation as
securing to the accused the right to cross-examine witnesses. 100 Historically,
cross-examination had been a core state constitutional value. 101 In Valles v.
State, the court of appeals observed that federal constitutional interpretation is
instructive in providing guidance to construction of state constitutional
protections, but it did not hold that federal interpretation would bind state
interpretation or control the parameters of the right. 102
Thus, Earnest relied on New Mexico decisions establishing an unbroken
line of authority that recognized cross-examination as the core of the
confrontation guarantee under the state constitution, 103 prior to the Supreme
Court‘s reversal in New Mexico v. Earnest.104 On remand, the state supreme
court elected to follow the lead of Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence105 and

95. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state court decision resting on an
―adequate and independent‖ state law ground precludes consideration of a federal constitutional
claim. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041–42 (1983).
96. See State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 876 (N.M. 1985).
97. State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987). In the brief on remand, the
author argued vigorously that the state court should consider Earnest‘s reliance on the New Mexico
constitutional confrontation protection as an alternative basis for review.
Brief for
Defendant/Appellant on Remand at 2, Earnest II, 744 P.2d 539 (No. 15,162). Regardless of what the
court may have thought about the quality of briefing, it did not discuss the state constitutional analog
to the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in affirming the conviction.
98. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 24; see State v. James, 415 P.2d 350, 352
(N.M. 1966).
99. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 1996).
100. See, e.g., James, 415 P.2d at 352.
101. See State v. Martin, 209 P.2d 525, 527 (N.M. 1949); State v. Jackson, 233 P. 49, 52 (N.M.
1924); Territory v. Ayers, 113 P. 604, 605 (N.M. 1910); Valles v. State, 563 P.2d 610, 613 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1977), cert. denied, 567 P.2d 486 (N.M. 1977); State v. Sparks, 512 P.2d 1265, 1266 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1973); State v. Holly, 445 P.2d 393, 395 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968).
102. 563 P.2d at 613.
103. State v. Martinez, 623 P.2d 565, 568 (N.M. 1981).
104. 477 U.S. 648 (1986).
105. Id. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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supplanted cross-examination with the indicia of reliability test 106 articulated
in Roberts107 and used in Lee v. Illinois.108
New Mexico has recognized that the state constitution may afford litigants
in state proceedings greater protection than that provided for by comparable
federal constitutional guarantees.109 Ten years after its affirmance on remand
in Earnest II, the state supreme court adopted the ―interstitial approach‖ to
evaluation of state constitutional law claims in State v. Gomez.110
The interstitial approach adopted by the Gomez court recognized that state
constitutional protections may be interpreted more broadly than their federal
constitutional counterparts in certain circumstances, including those situations
in which the federal guarantee suffers from flawed analysis. 111 In adopting
this approach, New Mexico rejected the lock-step alternative in which state
constitutional guarantees are construed as co-extensive with comparable
federal constitutional protections. 112 The Gomez court also held that
preservation of the state constitutional claim was sufficient for appeals if the
state constitutional provision relied upon is expressly raised by the litigant. 113
Despite Earnest‘s reference to Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico
Constitution in his original brief on direct appeal114 and his express reliance
on state constitutional confrontation protection as an alternative theory for
relief in arguing the case on remand from the Supreme Court and in his first
application for post-conviction relief, 115 the state courts consistently refused to
address the argument that admission of Boeglin‘s statement without crossexamination violated protections afforded by the state charter. 116 Following
its denial of relief on the post-conviction petition by the trial court,117 the
supreme court denied Earnest‘s petition for writ of certiorari to review that
action.118

106. State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987).
107. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
108. 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986).
109. See, e.g., State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 792, 803 (N.M. 1996) (recognizing greater due process
protection afforded by the state constitution where litigation was tainted by prosecutorial
misconduct).
110. 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 6.
113. Id. at 8.
114. Brief in Chief at 19, 23, State v. Earnest, No. 15,162 (N.M. Mar. 21, 1984).
115. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 24.
116. See State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987); State v. Earnest (Earnest I),
703 P.2d 872 (N.M. 1985).
117. State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 29, 1990) (order denying
petition for writ of habeas corpus).
118. Earnest v. State, No. 19,545 (N.M. Oct. 17, 1990) (order denying petition for writ of
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2. Earnest‘s Federal Habeas Litigation
Thwarted in the state courts, Earnest petitioned for federal habeas relief, 119
arguing that the state court had improperly applied Lee in holding that
Boeglin‘s confession was properly admitted at trial. 120 In Lee, the Supreme
Court did not hold that accomplice confessions were admissible per se or that
they necessarily fell within a deeply rooted exception to the hearsay rule. 121
In fact, the Court reversed in Lee, finding that the accomplice statement was
not properly admitted and rejecting the argument that its ―interlocking‖
content—tending to corroborate much of Lee‘s own statement to police—
rendered it reliable. 122 Moreover, with respect to accomplice statements, the
Lee Court stressed that these statements are presumptively unreliable, 123
requiring the proponent to demonstrate particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness to sustain the burden for admission without opportunity for
cross-examination.124
But the magistrate judge held that the state court had found particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness in Boeglin‘s inculpation of himself in a capital
crime and concluded that he did not make the statement in an effort to shift
blame to his accomplices.125 And the magistrate judge concurred in the state
court‘s conclusion while expressly not considering the factual corroboration
linking Boeglin to the offense to which he confessed in the reliability
analysis.126 Thus, the federal habeas court agreed with the state court‘s
conclusion that Boeglin‘s statement was sufficiently reliable to have been

certiorari).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) affords state court defendants the option of pursuing violations of
federal constitutional rights in state proceedings by petitioning for habeas relief in the federal district
courts, provided the claims have previously been exhausted in available state proceedings. See
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275–76 (2005) (Federal habeas corpus may order litigation held in
abeyance pending exhaustion of available state remedies when necessary to prevent dismissal of
petition barring consideration of colorable federal claims on the merits.); O‘Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 847–48 (1999) (Exhaustion requirement extends to require defendant to exhaust
discretionary remedies available in state process, even if state court policy discourages litigation.);
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516–17, 519 (1982) (Federal habeas petition containing both claims
that have been previously presented and decided by state courts and claims that have not previously
been presented to state courts are ―mixed‖ petitions that must be dismissed to afford petitioner
opportunity to exhaust available state remedies.).
120. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 1996).
121. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
122. Id. at 545–46.
123. Id. at 541.
124. Id. at 543.
125. Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1131–32.
126. Id. at 1132.
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admitted without Earnest being afforded an opportunity for cross-examination
while using a more restrictive formula for reaching its conclusion. 127
The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that an accomplice‘s inculpatory
statement to police, such as Boeglin‘s, fell within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception and thus was admissible without cross-examination based on that
theory of reliability under Roberts.128 But the circuit court agreed with the
federal habeas court that Boeglin‘s statement carried sufficient indicia of
reliability based upon the facts that guaranteed its trustworthiness. 129
Earnest‘s federal habeas litigation ended in 1996 when the Supreme Court
again denied his petition for certiorari challenging the state court‘s application
of Roberts and Lee to the admission of Boeglin‘s statement at trial.130
III. CRAWFORD: RESTORATION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION AS THE KEY TO
CONFRONTATION
Earnest‘s confrontation claim remained dormant until the Supreme Court
reversed the Washington Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington in
2004.131
Crawford involved the admission of a co-defendant‘s statement to police
without the defendant being afforded any opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant on the statement‘s contents or the circumstances under which the
statement was given. 132 Michael Crawford was charged with the murder of an
individual he believed had tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.133 He and Sylvia
both gave statements to police that diverged on potentially important points
concerning his motivation for the fatal assault.134 In his statement to police,
127. Id. at 1133.
128. Id. at 1131 (citing Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 n.5). The circuit court explained, ―Although it is a
statement against penal interest, cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), the Supreme Court has held that in this
context that hearsay exception ‗defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause
analysis.‘‖ Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1131.
129. Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1134.
130. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 519 U.S. 1016 (1996).
131. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The procedural context of Crawford is
significant because the Supreme Court heard the case following affirmance of Crawford‘s direct
appeal in the state court. See State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002). Under the Teague new
rules doctrine, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989), the Court is restricted in announcing a
change in interpretation of constitutional criminal procedure rules, and generally new procedural
rules cannot be recognized in the federal habeas process. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396–
97 (1994).
132. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 38–40. The facts of the case suggest the same troubling scenario that provides the
compelling plot of Otto Preminger‘s classic film, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia 1959), the
best criminal law movie ever made. The film was based on the novel of the same title, authored by
former Michigan Supreme Court Justice John Donaldson Voelker, writing under the pen name
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Michael claimed that he went to confront the victim, a fight ensued, and he
stabbed the victim in self-defense.135
At trial, the prosecution offered Sylvia‘s statement, which deviated from
Michael‘s claim of self-defense. 136 Contrary to Michael‘s account, Sylvia
denied having seen a weapon in the victim‘s hand during the fight.137 Despite
the fact that spousal privilege barred the prosecution from calling Sylvia as a
witness, Washington law permitted admission of her out-of-court statement to
police as a declaration against her penal interest. 138 Because Sylvia admitted
that she led her husband to the victim‘s apartment, the state trial court ruled
that her statement implicated her as a party to the assault and consequently
fell within the exception for statements against the declarant‘s penal
interest.139
Michael‘s trial counsel objected to admission of the statement, but the
state court found the statement sufficiently reliable to warrant admission in
the absence of cross-examination.140 The prosecutor argued in closing that
Sylvia‘s statement was ―damning evidence‖ contradicting Michael‘s claim of
self-defense, and the jury convicted.141
A. Crawford in Context
The legal landscape of confrontation changed dramatically in the Supreme
Court‘s decisions from Douglas in 1965 through Roberts‘s and Lee‘s
diminution of cross-examination as a critical component in the confrontation
construct. The changed landscape after Crawford reflected an aberration in
the traditional view of confrontation of the most troubling out-of-court
statements as grounded in the opportunity for cross-examination. A
―Robert Traver.‖ ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958). For more on Justice Voelker,
see Eileen Kavanagh, Robert Traver as Justice Voelker—The Novelist as Judge, 10 SCRIBES J.
LEGAL WRITING 91 (2005).
135. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38–40.
136. Id. at 39–40.
137. Id.
138. WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
139. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
140. Id. The Court summarized the trial court‘s views of Sylvia‘s statement as a declaration
against her interest:
The trial court here admitted the statement . . . offering several reasons why it
was trustworthy: Sylvia was not shifting blame but rather corroborating her
husband‘s story that he acted in self-defense or ―justified reprisal‖; she had
direct knowledge as an eyewitness; she was describing recent events; and she
was being questioned by a ―neutral‖ law enforcement officer.
Id.
141. Id. at 40–41.
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consideration of the landscape demonstrates that the Court‘s departure from
cross-examination as a primary concern in Roberts and Lee was neither wellgrounded in history142 nor suggestive of a true commitment to the new
doctrine in which reliability analysis supplanted the cross-examination
process as primary in consideration for admission of all hearsay.
In light of the Roberts and Lee confrontation formulation, admission of
Sylvia‘s statement against Michael at trial was arguably consistent with the
Court‘s compromise of the traditional notion of confrontation as
fundamentally coextensive with the opportunity for cross-examination. Under
Roberts and Lee, either of two operating premises supported admission of her
statement to police and the consequent conviction. 143 Sylvia‘s statement was
either admissible because it reflected a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule or because it bore sufficient indicia of reliability such that its credibility
or inherent truthfulness could be fairly inferred without the necessity for
testing by cross-examination.144
In assessing the existing legal landscape of confrontation, it is important
to note two distinct lines of thought that would coalesce in Crawford: the
traditional suspicion with which statements made by accomplices to police
have been viewed because of the declarant‘s acknowledged self-interest in
spreading blame or attempting to negotiate for leniency, and the historical
understanding that testimonial statements offered to incriminate the accused
in a criminal trial must be tested by cross-examination. In Crawford, these
two considerations undermined the credibility of the Court‘s approach in
Roberts and Lee, at least when addressing the lack of cross-examination in
factually similar contexts.
1. Confrontation and the Jury: Coy v. Iowa
The Court‘s liberalized approach to confrontation evident in Roberts and
Lee did not reflect a consensus that all presumably reliable out-of-court
statements should be admitted without testing by cross-examination. Even in
these decisions, the majority demanded that the prosecution demonstrate the
unavailability of the declarant and its diligence in attempting to secure the
presence of the witness for trial.145
142. Compare Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965), with Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
143. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
144. See id.
145. For example, in the wake of Pointer, the Court held in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723–
25 (1968), that prior testimony from a co-defendant taken when the accused was represented by
counsel would be admissible in the co-defendant‘s absence from trial only where the prosecution
demonstrated due diligence in attempting to procure his attendance to testify before the jury. The codefendant was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary in Texas at the time of Barber‘s trial in
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Viewing admission of uncrossed out-of-court statements as justifiable
only in circumstances in which the witness could not be produced for
testimony before the jury, the majority continued to press for reasonableness
in reliance on the exception to the preferred procedure of offering testimony
before the jury where it would be tested by cross-examination. 146 This is
because the confrontation guarantee embraces not only the concept of testing
for the opportunity to question the witness but also the value of having jurors
assess the credibility of responses given based on observation of the witness
during the cross-examination. 147 The Court had fully explained the function
of cross-examination in California v. Green,148 where the majority explained
that confrontation at trial is significant because it forces the witness to testify
under oath and penalty of perjury; ensures the opportunity for crossexamination, affording the accused the best available means to test the
accuracy of the testimony; and does so in the presence of jurors, allowing
them to consider the witness‘s demeanor in making a determination as to his
credibility. 149
Later, in Coy v. Iowa, 150 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in reiterating
the constitutional preference for face-to-face confrontation between the
accused and the witnesses against him in the presence of the jury: ―We have
never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact.‖151
Even the Roberts Court had conceded the constitutional preference for
face-to-face confrontation: ―The Court has emphasized that the Confrontation
Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial . . . .‖152
But Coy, while not overruled, was significantly limited in Maryland v.
Craig,153 where a different majority concluded that the policy interest in
protecting minor children from the trauma of testifying in open court before
the jury in child abuse cases justified alternative procedures for eliciting

Oklahoma, id. at 720, and the record showed that the prosecution had not taken appropriate steps to
procure his presence at trial, id. at 723.
146. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 545; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74.
147. Lee, 476 U.S. at 540 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)); Roberts,
448 U.S. at 63–64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895)).
148. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
149. Id. at 158.
150. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
151. Id. at 1016.
152. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (―[I]t is this
literal right to ‗confront‘ the witness at the time of the trial that forms the core of the values furthered
by the Confrontation Clause.‖)).
153. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).

2008]

CRAWFORD AND RETROACTIVITY

253

testimony. 154
While the Court did not dispense with face-to-face
confrontation between these witnesses and the accused, as the Iowa
procedure—employing a screen in the courtroom to prevent children from
having to observe their alleged abusers—had, the Court approved procedures
to remove the cross-examination from the immediate presence of jurors. 155
Thus, videotaped depositions and testimony by closed-circuit television may
supplant direct confrontation in the courtroom before the jury, if necessary to
prevent further trauma to the child from testifying before strangers. 156
Nevertheless, the underlying proposition that direct confrontation during
the cross-examination process remained the preferred model for ensuring the
accused‘s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him
continued to require that significant policy interests be demonstrated before
that model was rendered inapplicable. One of those interests, of course, is the
public‘s legitimate expectation for prosecution despite the unavailability of a
key prosecution witness.
2. Accomplice Declarations as Inherently Suspect: Lee v. Illinois
The Supreme Court reversed Lee‘s conviction based on the admission of
her co-defendant‘s statement to police that inculpated both of them. 157 The
declarant, Lee‘s boyfriend, Thomas, was unavailable to testify because he
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. 158 Assuming that declarations
against the penal interests of declarants are generally trustworthy and thus
admissible under Ohio v. Roberts—despite the fact that the contents of the
statement cannot be tested by cross-examination—the reversal in Lee must
have been predicated on something in the nature of the particular declarant‘s
status as an accomplice or the statement itself.
The critical factors that supported the reversal included the non-testifying
accomplice‘s generic status as an accomplice in the commission of the
crime. 159 The Court observed: ―Over the years since Douglas, the Court has
spoken with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable accomplices‘
confessions that incriminate defendants.‖160 This same concern, that an
accomplice‘s accusation is ―presumptively suspect‖ because of the possibility
that the declarant has something to gain by implicating another,161 was
154. Id. at 853.
155. See id. at 851.
156. Id. at 853–55.
157. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546–47 (1986).
158. See id. at 536. The trials were severed and neither defendant testified except at hearings
on their respective motions to suppress their confessions. Id.
159. See id. at 541.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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certainly evident in Boeglin‘s statement that arguably implicated Earnest, in
which Boeglin stated his interest in making a deal in return for his cooperation
with authorities.162 Yet, while the admission of Thomas‘s statement as
substantive evidence against Lee required reversal, according to the majority,
the same Court vacated Earnest‘s reversal, setting in motion the twenty-year
history of Earnest‘s incarceration following the remand of the case to the state
court and the consequent reinstatement of his conviction. 163
Second, the statement made by Thomas differed significantly from Lee‘s,
particularly in his admission that they had discussed the killing of Lee‘s aunt
prior to the fatal attack.164 Lee claimed that Thomas had first stabbed her
aunt‘s friend, apparently angered by a look the friend had given them, 165
which led Lee‘s aunt to attack Lee. Lee claimed that she stabbed her aunt in
self-defense. 166 Thomas confessed after being informed that Lee had already
given a statement, and she ―implored‖ him to share blame for the offense. 167
Thus, the circumstances under which Thomas gave his statement undermined
the suggested particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for
admission of an accomplice‘s statement as a declaration against penal
interest.168
In fact, the Lee majority pointed to those factors in rejecting reliance on
her accomplice‘s confession to establish the degree of Lee‘s guilt. 169 The
same factors, present in Earnest, undermined Justice Rehnquist‘s reasoning in
his concurrence in New Mexico v. Earnest.170 Moreover, prior to the Court‘s
reconsideration of Roberts in Crawford, the lack of appreciation for the
significance of the Lee factors tainted the Roberts rationale‘s application to
convictions based on accomplice statements to police.
The Lee majority specifically held that accomplice statements do not fall
within a general exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against interest

162. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996).
163. See New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986). The Lee majority recognized not only
the traditional suspicion with which accomplice statements are viewed, but also the inherently strong
prejudice that attends the fact of the confession itself. 476 U.S. at 542. The Lee Court looked to its
earlier holding in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135–36 (1968), where it concluded that the
jointly inculpatory aspect of an accomplice‘s confession constituted such powerful evidence that
jurors could not be expected to disregard its use as evidence of the accused‘s guilt when admitted
only against the co-defendant declarant, regardless of the strength of the trial court‘s admonitions that
jurors not consider the confession in determining guilt. Lee, 476 U.S. at 542.
164. Lee, 476 U.S. at 534–35.
165. Id. at 533.
166. See id. at 534.
167. Id. at 544.
168. Id. at 543–44.
169. Id. at 544.
170. See 477 U.S. 648, 649 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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but actually constituted a far narrower category. 171 Nevertheless, while Lee
obtained a reversal, the majority‘s reiteration of the Roberts rationale for
admissibility permitted Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence in New Mexico
v. Earnest, to set in motion the liberalization of admission of accomplice
statements signaling that lower courts could rely on Roberts as a theoretical
justification for admission of statements falling within the narrower class of
inherently suspect statements. 172
The Lee majority also rejected two additional arguments advanced for
admission of the accomplice‘s statement without the opportunity for crossexamination at trial. First, the significant differences in the content of the two
statements rebutted the claim that they were interlocking, and thus the
reliability of Thomas‘s statement was established by references to the
admissions made by Lee in her own statement. 173 Of course, the prosecution
offered Thomas‘s statement precisely because it diverged from Lee‘s
admissions on the factual question of whether she was truly justified in killing
her aunt or, in fact, had planned the murder with Thomas. Second, because
the issue at the hearing was the voluntariness of the statements rather than
their accuracy, the fact that Lee‘s counsel was afforded an opportunity to
cross-examine Thomas during the joint hearing on their motions to suppress
their respective statements did not afford Lee a meaningful opportunity to
cross Thomas.174
The vacation of Earnest‘s reversal by the New Mexico Supreme Court and
remand for reconsideration in light of Lee should never have led to Earnest‘s
continued incarceration through the substantial unsuccessful litigation prior to
the state court‘s retroactive application of Crawford in his case. Lee‘s
reversal was ordered on far less compelling facts, particularly in light of the
fact that Lee herself had confessed, implicating herself in the offense, in
contrast to Earnest, who never confessed to police and testified at trial—being
subjected to cross-examination—that he was not involved in the offense at all.
3. Reconsidering ―Penal Interest‖: Williamson v. United States
Admission of accomplice statements continued to earn the Court‘s focus
after Lee and New Mexico v. Earnest. In Williamson v. United States,175 the
Court considered the admission of out-of-court statements made by nontestifying accomplices in light of the exception to the hearsay rule for

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 n.5.
Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist J., concurring).
Lee, 476 U.S. at 546.
Id. at 546 n.6.
512 U.S. 594 (1994).
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statements contrary to the declarant‘s penal interest.176 Later, in Lilly v.
Virginia,177 the majority returned to the admissibility of accomplice
statements not subjected to testing by cross-examination.178 Both decisions
suggest uneasiness with the overreaching engaged in by the Roberts Court in
adopting a model for resolution of admissibility questions in which
assumptions made about the reliability of statements against penal interest
supplanted the strict requirement that the accused have a meaningful
opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant.179
Significantly, Williamson was not predicated on the Sixth Amendment
confrontation guarantee, but the decision did suggest a retreat from the rather
open-ended approach to reliability assumptions as a substitute for crossexamination in the admission of accomplice statements.180 The majority
noted that the reference to the declarant‘s ―statement‖ in Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(b)(3) could have both expansive and narrow meanings. 181
The expansive reading of the accomplice‘s statement would provide that
the entirety of a statement made by an accomplice inculpating himself would
be admissible, while the narrow view would authorize admission of only those
parts of a statement that were in fact self-inculpatory. 182 The majority
distinguished between those portions of a statement that are truly selfinculpatory and thus might demonstrate the assumed reliability underlying the
rationale of the exception to the hearsay rule and those that are not necessarily
self-inculpatory, including assertions regarding the culpability of others. 183
The Court reversed based on the admission of the entirety of the statement
made by Harris implicating Williamson, holding:
[W]e cannot conclude that all that Harris said was properly
admitted. Some of Harris‘ confession would clearly have
been admissible under Rule 804(b)(3); for instance, when he
said he knew there was cocaine in the suitcase, he essentially
forfeited his only possible defense to a charge of cocaine
possession, lack of knowledge. But other parts of his
confession, especially the parts that implicated Williamson,
did little to subject Harris himself to criminal liability. A
176. Id. at 598–605; see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (―statement[s] which . . . at the time of [their]
making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person
in the declarant‘s position would not have made the statement[s] unless believing [them] to be true‖).
177. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
178. Id. at 127, 130–34.
179. See id. at 128; Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599–600.
180. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605.
181. Id. at 599.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 599–601.

2008]

CRAWFORD AND RETROACTIVITY

257

reasonable person in Harris‘ position might even think that
implicating someone else would decrease his practical
exposure to criminal liability, at least so far as sentencing
goes.184
The Williamson Court thus drew a line based on the rule that would exclude
those portions of the declarant‘s statement serving to inculpate an accomplice
but not actually implicating the declarant himself.
This approach suggested nothing less than that the admission of portions
of Boeglin‘s statement inculpating Earnest but not directly inculpating
Boeglin or minimizing his own culpability should not have been admitted at
Earnest‘s trial. But the Tenth Circuit rejected Earnest‘s reliance on the
relatively recent decision in Williamson.185 The circuit court observed that the
lower courts had not based their conclusion that Boeglin‘s statement was
properly admitted at trial solely on the fact that it could be characterized as a
statement against Boeglin‘s penal interest. 186 Instead, the court agreed that
Boeglin‘s statement against his penal interest was admissible against Earnest
because the statement additionally had been found to have particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness discerned in the lower courts‘ analyses. 187
The Tenth Circuit noted that the magistrate judge held that Boeglin‘s
statement demonstrated the requisite reliability for admission based on the
following:
In addition to finding that the statement was primarily against
Boeglin‘s penal interest, the magistrate determined that the
statement was reliable because: (1) Boeglin was not induced
by promises by the police or district attorney to confess;
(2) Boeglin had no cause to retaliate against Earnest nor
would he lightly decide to be a ―snitch‖; (3) Boeglin was
willing to undergo a lie detector test; and (4) Boeglin‘s
emotional state was no more agitated than would be expected
from one arrested on a murder charge.188
Yet, none of these findings demonstrated any particular reliability on
Boeglin‘s part; rather, at best they merely reflected no affirmative facts that
184. Id. at 604.
185. Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1133–34 (10th Cir. 1996). Earnest argued that
Williamson provided guidance in the resolution of his constitutional confrontation claim, while
recognizing that the decision had been based on construction and application of the applicable federal
evidence rule, rather than on Sixth Amendment grounds. See id.
186. Id. at 1134.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1132.

258

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:231

would undermine his credibility. For example, the issue of whether Boeglin
lacked cause to retaliate against Earnest actually simply shows that the
magistrate found no motive for retaliation, but that does not make the
statement reliable; instead, a finding of an obvious motive for retaliation
would have served to demonstrate its likely unreliability. In other words, the
underlying theory of admissibility was simply that Boeglin inculpated himself
and that there were no apparent factors compromising the integrity of his
assertions to police.
This approach reflects the flaw inherent in reliability analysis because it
focuses on the lack of objective factors undermining reliability rather than on
positive factors supporting reliability. For instance, the ―fact‖ that Boeglin
was willing to take a lie detector test presupposes he would have passed the
test. But that fact can hardly substitute for a passing score, and there is no
evidence that Boeglin ever passed, or indeed took, or was even offered a
polygraph test to support his statement. Had he been offered the test, taken it,
and passed it, that fact might have indicated the reliability of his statement but
for the typical problem posed by the general inadmissibility of polygraph
examination results.
Similarly, the magistrate judge relied on the ―fact‖ that Boeglin was not
offered any kind of deal, yet his statement itself reflects that he was trying to
make a deal for cooperation. 189 The court quoted from the actual statement: ―I
was hoping I could make some kind of deal.‖ 190 And, in the quoted portion of
his statement, Boeglin claimed that his role in the actual murder involved an
attempt to cut the victim‘s throat, yet the knife would not cut, and someone
else shot the victim. 191 Here, Boeglin‘s intent both to make a deal with police
by cooperating and to minimize his actual participation in the murder itself
reflects precisely the considerations leading the Williamson majority to

189. Id. at 1131–32.
190. Id. at 1134.
191. Id. The circuit court quoted from Boeglin‘s statement:
I was setting here, [the victim] was here, Rob was here, and I was there, and
uh—I opened up my door and the car slid around like that, and I fell out
my . . . door, and uh—[the victim] jumped out his, and—soon as he turned, he
caught it by—right between the eyes and uh—he . . . was still alive, and I had
the knife with me—I went to cut his throat, but it didn‘t cut—and I was—cut it
again and it just barely cut it, and—I just dropped the knife after that—and—I
don‘t know who else—could it be, but uh—the gun started jamming up, and
uh—I don‘t know how many shots he jammed on—they reloaded it, and—fired
two more shots into him—uh I guess into his head, I don‘t know—then we
jumped into the car . . . and cleaned up everything . . . .
Id.
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restrict admission of out-of-court statements by accomplices. 192 But in
Williamson, the majority found that Harris‘s statement had been improperly
admitted based on a generic categorization of its contents as against his
interest and reversed where no independent consideration of the contents and
their implications for credibility had been undertaken. 193 Because the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the findings of lower courts on the existence of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness supporting admissions had been
made by the state court and magistrate judge, it held that Williamson did not
require relief in Earnest.194
Williamson showed the Court‘s continuing concern with admission of
non-testifying accomplices‘ statements made to police as substantive evidence
against their alleged confederates at trial. The Court did not expressly
overrule Williamson in Crawford.
However, the admission of the
accomplice‘s testimony statement without testing by cross-examination is
clearly barred by Crawford, assuming defense counsel timely objects or
moves to exclude the statement. However, Williamson retains validity with
regard to admission of statements purportedly made to third persons rather
than police, or not intended for use as testimony in an official proceeding or in
the context of a civil trial.
4. Foreshadowing Crawford: Lilly v. Virginia
Lilly addressed similar concerns about the admission of out-of-court
statements by accomplices not available for cross-examination before the trial
jury.195 But it did so in one particularly critical context; in Lilly the out-ofcourt declaration was not clearly self-inculpatory on the key issue at the
defendant‘s trial.196 Although the declarant, Mark Lilly, admitted that he had
been drinking with his brother, Benjamin Lilly, and his co-defendant, Barker,
he denied that he had participated in the capital crime at all, implicating
Benjamin in the planning of the carjacking and murder of the victim. 197 Mark
Lilly‘s statement placed him in proximity of the offense and admittedly
showed him to be a willing participant in some of the less serious offenses
committed by the three men during a crime spree that lasted two days. 198 He
identified his brother, however, as the individual who shot the murder
victim. 199
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 604 (1994).
Id.
Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1133–34.
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 120–21.
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The state trial court admitted Mark Lilly‘s statement at his brother‘s trial
as an admission against his penal interest. 200 Benjamin was convicted of the
capital murder and sentenced to death. 201 On appeal, the state supreme court
upheld the conviction, finding that Mark‘s statement to police was properly
admitted as a declaration against his penal interest. 202 Under Virginia law, the
court held that statements against penal interest constitute ―‗firmly rooted‘
exception[s] to the hearsay rule,‖203 relying on the Court‘s decision in White v.
Illinois,204 which had recognized that certain kinds of statements had
traditionally been regarded as sufficiently reliable for admission at trial
despite the lack of opportunity for testing by cross-examination. 205 The state
court conceded that Mark Lilly‘s statement actually shifted blame for the
capital crime to his brother but held that his apparent motivation in doing so
could be considered by the trial jury in evaluating the credibility of his
assertions to police. 206
Justice Stevens, writing for Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, led the
plurality in rejecting the state court‘s finding that the penal interest exception
constituted a ―firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule‖ alone justifying
admission of Mark Lilly‘s statement without testing by cross-examination. 207
Instead, the plurality observed that this exception was simply too broad, 208
defining a class too large for analysis, as the Lee Court had found.209 So for
the plurality, admission of such statements would be acceptable only if the
statement not only was contrary to the declarant‘s penal interest, but also met
the Roberts requirement for particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.210 In

200. Id. at 121–22.
201. Id. at 122.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). In White, the Court seemingly retreated from its earlier holding in
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), regarding admissibility of statements made by child declarants
concerning abuse. In contrast to statements that were effectively the product of questioning or
interrogation, as in Wright, 497 U.S. at 826–27, the White Court found that the spontaneous
statements to an officer were admissible as fitting within a ―firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule,‖ White, 502 U.S. at 355–56. Thus, the White Court concluded that ―[w]here proffered hearsay
has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule,
the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.‖ Id. at 356. In Crawford, Justice Scalia questioned the
viability of White in light of the fact that the question addressed there focused on the unavailability of
the witness. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004).
205. White, 502 U.S. at 356.
206. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 122–23 (citing Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va.
1998)).
207. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127–34.
208. Id. at 127.
209. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986).
210. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134–35.
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so holding, however, the plurality did not reject the penal interest exception as
wholly insufficient for admission of accomplice statements.211 Rather, it
simply approached their admission with the same extreme caution noted by
Justice Blackmun, the author of Ohio v. Roberts,212 in dissenting in Lee:
[A]ccomplice confessions ordinarily are untrustworthy
precisely because they are not unambiguously adverse to the
penal interest of the declarant. It is of course against one‘s
penal interest to confess to criminal complicity, but often that
interest can be advanced greatly by ascribing the bulk of the
blame to one‘s confederates. It is in circumstances raising the
latter possibility—circumstances in which the accomplice‘s
out-of-court statements implicating the defendant may be
very much in the accomplice‘s penal interest—that we have
viewed the accomplice‘s statements as ―inevitably
suspect.‖213
The plurality insisted that admission of Mark Lilly‘s statement implicating his
brother in the capital murder could not rest simply on its character as a
statement against his penal interest but must also satisfy the requirement for
added indicia of reliability or guarantees of its trustworthiness. 214 Here, the
plurality concluded that Mark‘s allegations in the statement failed to meet the
constitutional standard for admission without testing by cross-examination. 215
The plurality found, for instance, that the mere fact the statement
accurately described the offense—that it was corroborated by other evidence
at trial—was irrelevant. 216 Similarly, the plurality rejected the State‘s reliance
on the fact that Mark‘s statement was made voluntarily after he had been
warned of his constitutional rights, finding that ―a suspect‘s consciousness of
his Miranda rights has little, if any, bearing on the likelihood of truthfulness
of his statements.‖217 And finally, the plurality concluded that the mere fact
that Mark‘s statement subjected him to ―technical‖ criminal liability was
insufficient to demonstrate its reliability precisely because it contained

211. Id.
212. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
213. Lee, 476 U.S. at 552–53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 136, 141–42 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)) (―Due to his strong motivation to implicate the
defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant‘s statements about what the defendant said or did
are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence.‖).
214. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134–35.
215. Id. at 137.
216. Id. at 137–38 (relying on Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990)).
217. Id. at 138.
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material inculpating others, citing the ―natural motive [for him] to attempt to
exculpate himself as much as possible.‖218
The remainder of the Court concurred in the reversal ordered by the
plurality. Justices Scalia and Thomas limited their agreement only insofar as
the statement admitted constituted a statement made for purposes of official
proceedings—that is, Mark Lilly‘s statement constituted testimonial hearsay
requiring testing by cross-examination. 219 They did not join in Justice
Stevens‘s lengthy analysis of the penal interest exception and its role vis-à-vis
the confrontation guarantee, leaving open the possibility that non-testimonial
hearsay would be subject to admission without the required heightened
analysis the plurality would impose for statements offered as within that
exception. 220 The Chief Justice, joined by Justices O‘Connor and Kennedy,
concurred in the result 221 but declined to hold that the penal interest exception
was not traditionally recognized precisely because he found that the statement
was insufficiently inculpatory as to Mark Lilly to warrant admission as a
penal interest exception at all. 222 Similarly, the Chief Justice also concluded
that the prosecution had failed to meet the second prong of Roberts, a showing
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission of
accomplice statements required to meet the heightened reliability showing the
plurality demanded.223
Thus, the Chief Justice, consistent with his earlier position in New Mexico
v. Earnest,224 did not assess the constitutional viability of Ohio v. Roberts for
admission of accomplice statements. Instead of confronting the questions
about whether the standards upon which the lower court had admitted the
statement were themselves appropriate, he simply found that neither standard
could be met in light of the state court‘s opinion. 225 He concurred in the
disposition because Virginia had failed under either existing approach that he
had previously endorsed in Earnest.226
What emerges from the split in the Court in Lilly is that the decision failed
to resolve issues relating to admission of accomplice confessions in the

218. Id. at 138–39 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 143–44 (Thomas, J., concurring).
220. See id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 143–44 (Thomas, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 144, 146 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
222. Id. at 146. The plurality concluded: ―The decisive fact, which we make explicit today, is
that accomplices‘ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence.‖ Id. at 134 & n.5.
223. Id. at 149.
224. 477 U.S. 648 (1986).
225. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 145–48.
226. Id.
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absence of cross-examination, while at the same time suggesting that the
Roberts doctrine had simply proved unworkable in the context of the
confrontation guarantee, at least with respect to the inherently suspect
statements of accomplices. For instance, in post-Lilly cases the New Mexico
Supreme Court departed from the plurality‘s rejection of the penal interest
exception, standing alone, as warranting admission of accomplice statements
without cross-examination.
In a series of cases, the New Mexico court declined to be bound by the
Lilly plurality‘s view, instead carving out a state law exception to crossexamination for declarations held to be against the declarant‘s penal interest,
much as Virginia had. In State v. Torres,227 the court had held that it regarded
this hearsay exception to be firmly rooted. 228 There, the out-of-court
statement inculpating the defendant had been introduced at trial through a
police detective who testified that it had been made by an accomplice during
interrogation after the declarant denied remembering the events that were
purportedly reflected in the contents of the statement. 229
The defense argued that the court should follow the Supreme Court‘s
analysis in Williamson and hold that the trial court erred in admitting the
statement because it was not truly self-inculpatory and primarily contrary to
the declarant‘s interest and, consequently, did not come within the ambit of
the hearsay exception.230 The court noted that it was not bound by the
Supreme Court‘s construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence but chose to
follow the Court‘s lead. 231 It also explained the New Mexico view that the
penal interest exception reflects a traditionally recognized exception to the
hearsay rule under state law.232 Because the witness had provided information
implicating him in the offense generally, the court concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the statement was against his
penal interest.233 Although the witness claimed to be unable to recall the
contents of his statement, the court pointed out that he was vigorously crossed
on this failure of memory. 234 The court thus concluded that there was no
227. 971 P.2d 1267 (N.M. 1998). The court held in Torres that statements against penal
interest function as per se exceptions to the general confrontation requirements because such
statements are firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule and therefore bear ―adequate indicia of
reliability.‖ Id. at 1277–78.
228. Id. at 1277.
229. Id. at 1270.
230. Id. at 1271.
231. Id. at 1272.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1274–75.
234. Id. at 1276. The court relied on United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 556, 560 (1988),
where the Court held that confrontation was satisfied by the opportunity to cross a witness claiming
memory loss because the jury was able to assess the witness‘s demeanor while testifying under oath.
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confrontation violation where there had been opportunity to cross the
declarant and where the statement arguably exposed him to prosecution for
homicide. 235
The court later affirmed its position in Torres in State v. Gonzales.236
However, it did so in the context of testimony by a co-conspirator who
reported inculpatory statements made to him by the accused. 237 On rehearing,
the Gonzales court considered the applicability of the intervening decision in
Lilly.238 It explained that Lilly was not persuasive because the statement
reviewed there would not have met the requirements for admission under the
New Mexico evidence rule authorizing admission of declarations against
penal interest 239 because it was not against the declarant‘s interest. 240
Moreover, the court distinguished Lilly precisely because the accomplice‘s
statement in Gonzales had been made to a third person, not to police during
the course of custodial interrogation. 241
The court again rejected reliance on Lilly in State v. MartinezRodriguez,242 noting that it had previously rejected the applicability of Lilly on
rehearing in Gonzales.243 Once again, the statement admitted in MartinezRodriguez was contained in a letter purportedly written by the defendant to his
confederates rather than having been made during the course of police
interrogation.244
And in State v. Desnoyers,245 the court again considered the admission of
out-of-court declarations against penal interest made to third persons rather
than in the context of custodial interrogation by police or in testimonial
statements intended for use in official proceedings. 246 The statement
inculpating the accused was purportedly made by the co-defendant to another
inmate while in custody, who then testified at the defendant‘s trial. 247 The

235. Torres, 971 P.2d at 1280.
236. 989 P.2d 419 (N.M. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1025 (2000).
237. Id. at 421.
238. Id. at 426–27.
239. N.M. R. EVID. 11-804(B)(3).
240. Gonzales, 989 P.2d at 428.
241. Id. at 426–27.
242. 33 P.3d 267 (N.M. 2001).
243. Id. at 278. The state court rejected the argument that its continuing acceptance of the
penal interest exception as a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule should be repudiated in light
of Lilly. Id. Instead, it concluded: ―We are unpersuaded by Defendant‘s argument and reaffirm that,
in New Mexico, a statement against penal interest within the meaning of Rule 11-804(B)(3) is a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.‖ Id.
244. Id. at 277.
245. 55 P.3d 968 (N.M. 2002).
246. Id. at 974–75.
247. Id.
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court noted that the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine the testifying
witness at trial on the question of his credibility. 248 The court rejected the
claim that the defendant was denied confrontation because he could not
compel the co-defendant who purportedly bragged about the offense to others
in jail to testify and be cross-examined about the claims made by the jailhouse
informant.249
The New Mexico Supreme Court thus continued to apply the exception to
hearsay for statements against penal interest as a firmly rooted hearsay
exception well after the Lilly plurality had called this substitute for crossexamination into question. But the critical issue posed by Lilly and later
Crawford simply was not present because no cases involved statements
admitted in trial that were testimonial statements made by accomplices to
police and thus susceptible to the suspicion that they represented distortions of
facts designed to benefit the declarant.250
Not only did Lilly suggest the Court‘s movement away from the analytical
framework based on assumptions of reliability as supplanting the requirement
for cross-examination, at least with regard to accomplice statements to
police,251 but also it had a definite implication for Earnest. Had his claim
248. Id. at 975.
249. Id. at 974–75.
250. In State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 146 (N.M. 2005), the New Mexico
Supreme Court referred to this prior line of cases before discussing Crawford. The court noted:
From Earnest II up until Johnson, New Mexico courts continually applied the
Roberts reliability test (―indicia of reliability‖) to accomplice statements,
regardless of whether there had been an opportunity to cross-examine.
Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146 (citing State v. Desnoyers, 55 P.3d 968 (N.M. 2002); State v. MartinezRodriguez, 33 P.3d 267 (N.M. 2001); State v. Torres, 971 P.2d 1267 (N.M. 1998)). Westlaw‘s
KeyCite feature indicates that Forbes abrogated the court‘s prior decisions in both MartinezRodriguez and Desnoyers, but this conclusion is in doubt because the admission of out-of-court
statements made contrary to the declarant‘s interests in both cases did not involve an inability to
challenge testimonial statements by cross-examination. Because the statements in both cases had not
been made with expectation of their use in subsequent litigation—whether because they were made
to co-defendants or while bragging to inmates, respectively—statements of these types likely remain
admissible in a post-Crawford world because they are not testimonial in nature. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (―An accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
not.‖); see also State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 707 (N.M. 2004) (recognizing that Crawford
left open the possibility that non-testimonial statements would continue to be admitted under the
exception).
251. But as the Crawford majority would note, the apparent caution urged by the Court in Lilly
in admitting accomplice statements, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999), was in fact not
borne out in practice in the country‘s trial courts, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63–64. The Crawford Court
counted and cited some dozen post-Lilly cases in which accomplice statements had been admitted
despite the absence of cross-examination and noted Professor Roger Kirst‘s conclusion that in
twenty-five of seventy post-Lilly cases, trial courts had ruled uncrossed accomplice statements
admissible. Id. at 63–64; see Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation
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involving admission of Boeglin‘s statement at trial been presented to the
Court after Lilly, the combined reasoning of the four-Justice plurality rejecting
the penal interest exception, standing alone as the basis for admissibility, with
the votes of Justices Scalia and Thomas, would have formed a solid core of
votes for reversal of his conviction.252
It would, however, take the Court‘s decision in Crawford for Earnest to
seize the opportunity for relief.
B. Crawford’s Rejection of the Flawed Rationale of Roberts and Lee
Justice Scalia began his assault on Roberts in Crawford eloquently:
―Roberts‘ failings were on full display in the proceedings below.‖ 253
The Crawford Court approached the question of admissibility of Sylvia‘s
statement from a general posture favoring in-court cross-examination but did
so based on the particularly important factual context of the case. 254 Because
Sylvia was an accomplice in the offense, 255 regardless of potential limitations
on the extent of her culpability, the opinion rests in large part upon the
importance of cross-examination in testing the reliability of Sylvia as a
witness and the accuracy of her assertions.256 Instead of relying on
generalizations about the reliability of her statement as against her own
interest, the majority looked to the rationale supporting cross-examination as
essential to the defense in this context.
The unique role of cross-examination for purposes of the confrontation
guarantee is at the heart of Justice Scalia‘s reappraisal in Crawford. The
historical significance of the law‘s concern for the right of the accused to
respond to a criminal charge is evident in Justice Scalia‘s lengthy discussion
of the origin of the confrontation right in the common law.257 But his opinion
did not reflect a novel approach in the Court;258 in fact, in Mattox v. United

Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 105 (2003).
252. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Twice Grilled, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 151, 153–55 (2003)
(noting the vote in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), supported the New Mexico Supreme Court
disposition in Earnest I).
253. 541 U.S. at 65.
254. Id. at 68–69.
255. Id. at 65.
256. See id. at 66.
257. Justice Scalia‘s opinion for the majority includes extensive historical analysis of
confrontation, focusing on English common law traditions—particularly with respect to the
significance of the absence of cross-examination raised as an issue in the trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh—and early American precedents. Id. at 43–62.
258. In fact, the Crawford Court had observed that the disposition in Roberts was consistent
with its holding in other decisions, while characterizing the rationale advanced by the Roberts
majority as overly broad. Id. at 60. The Court reiterated this assessment in Whorton v. Bockting, 127
S. Ct. 1173, 1179 (2007).
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States, a similar historical analysis had been employed in justifying admission
of prior testimony elicited in proceedings prior to a witness‘s death. 259
The thrust of Roberts is that if statements are sufficiently reliable, either
because they reflect firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule or are marked
by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, cross-examination affords
little additional protection for the defendant at trial.260 For the criminal
defendant, the importance of cross-examination lies not only in the
opportunity to question the factual accuracy of assertions made in the
accomplice‘s statement that implicate the accused, but also in requiring the
accomplice to function as any other witness whose credibility is subject to
assessment by the jury observing his or her testimony. The value of crossexamination is particularly important where the witness has claimed particular
knowledge about the offense that is offered as credible precisely because the
witness is an accomplice who has every reason to know about the particular
facts of the offense and the defendant‘s role in its commission. 261 For the
same reason, the accomplice has available the most compelling tool for
manipulating the investigation and prosecution of the case to shift primary
focus to the accused and away from the accomplice.
The Roberts Court‘s rationale failed to accommodate the very dangerous
prospect that accomplices can manipulate the prosecution process in a way
that distorts the fact-finding function to their benefit. This is evident in Lee
when the Court admitted that those witnesses are inherently suspect yet failed
to draw a line in the Roberts doctrine preventing the use of its ―reliability‖
assumptions in dispensing with the need for cross-examination.262
Although Sylvia‘s status as an accomplice raised the traditional concern
for the credibility of accomplices who may be seeking to implicate others in
an effort to better themselves in the criminal investigation, Crawford does not
limit the Court‘s requirement for cross-examination to admission of
accomplice or co-defendant declarations.263 Rather, the opinion focuses on all
statements that are testimonial in nature, reflecting their intended or expected
use in official proceedings so that statements made by other witnesses who are

259. See 156 U.S. 237, 240–42, 246–50 (1895).
260. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
261. Nevertheless, courts still consider the accomplice‘s ability to describe the circumstances
of the offense with particularity as especially important, even though it would appear to be the very
minimum that should be expected of an accomplice implicating himself and others in the commission
of a crime. See, for example, the Tenth Circuit‘s observation in Earnest v. Dorsey in valuing the
credibility of Boeglin‘s untested statement: ―[W]e find the statement describes the crime at a level of
detail which would be difficult to render in a fabricated admission.‖ 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir.
1996).
262. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986).
263. See 541 U.S. at 68.
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not susceptible to being characterized as accomplices are also governed by the
holding.264 This has certainly been demonstrated in the post-Crawford history
of litigation of confrontation claims. 265
Crawford is significant precisely because the Court did not simply
announce a departure from existing precedent in announcing a new rule of
constitutional criminal procedure266—these pronouncements have been
common over the past half century of the Court‘s review of criminal process
in light of the protections afforded by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, the Court rejected the implication drawn
from prior decisions that had led lower courts to conclude that admission of
non-crossed statements of non-testifying co-defendants was permissible if
those statements met certain criteria for credibility. 267 The Court found
instead:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers‘ design to afford the States
flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.
Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of ―testimonial.‖ Whatever else the
term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial;
and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices
with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed. 268
The Crawford Court‘s decision in reversing the trend toward admission of
declarants‘ out-of-court statements not subject to cross-examination reflects
an appreciation for the historical context in which the Sixth Amendment
264. Id.
265. For an interesting assessment of the extent to which Crawford and Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 832–33 (2006) (the Court acknowledging that the cross-examination requirement will
have the perverse effect of protecting perpetrators of domestic abuse whose victims are unwilling to
testify in court by restricting admission of their reports of abuse to police), have actually
disadvantaged certain classes of litigants, such as battered women, see generally Tom Lininger,
Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 272 (2006).
266. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (―[A] case announces a new rule if the
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant‘s conviction became final.‖).
267. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–68.
268. Id. at 68.
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confrontation guarantee serves the interest of accurate fact-finding. 269 The
decision is limited in important respects—addressing only the issue of
admission of testimonial statements, that is, statements either deliberately
designed for use in official proceedings or likely to result in their use for
purposes of proof of fact in a judicial proceeding. 270 The Court noted that
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony not subjected to crossexamination, and ―similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially‖ fit within the context of testimonial
statements typically requiring testing by cross-examination prior to
admission.271 Thus not all out-of-court statements implicate the element of
cross-examination as critical to the confrontation guarantee. 272
Significantly, Crawford demonstrates the willingness of some Justices to
re-examine doctrine that has wandered from the traditional understanding of
limitations imposed upon government through manipulation associated with
more flexible approaches to constitutional interpretation.273 Inexplicably, the
Justices never alluded to or even cited the Rehnquist concurrence in New
Mexico v. Earnest in assessing the Court‘s perceived error in Roberts.274 In
returning to historical sources when assessing the context in which the
confrontation guarantee was articulated, the Court repudiated the more
flexible view of the protection advanced in Ohio v. Roberts, one in which a
general paradigm for assessing reliability had replaced the formal process of
cross-examination for resolution of Sixth Amendment questions. 275 But
Crawford represents more than a manifestation of a strict constructionist
approach that defers to the historical context in which the Constitution is to be
interpreted. It addresses a most troubling problem for criminal defendants—
the inability to challenge allegations that are often false and almost always
self-serving that have been admitted as evidence at trial under a generalized
theory of their potential for reliability.
IV. CRAWFORD AND ITS RETROACTIVE APPLICATION IN EARNEST
The New Mexico Supreme Court overruled State v. Torres276 in its 2004
decision in State v. Alvarez-Lopez,277 based on the Supreme Court‘s action in
269. Justice White, writing for the majority in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 n.10
(1970), also traced the historical roots of cross-examination to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. See
supra note 257.
270. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69.
271. Id. at 51.
272. Id. (―[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment‘s core concerns.‖).
273. See id. at 68.
274. See id. at 62–65.
275. See id. at 61.
276. State v. Torres, 971 P.2d 1267 (N.M. 1998).
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Crawford.278 In so doing, Justice Minzner referred to the ―splintered‖ opinion
in Lilly that had invited significant comment but had effectively permitted the
court to continue to hold that the penal interest exception constituted a firmly
rooted exception under New Mexico law.279 The court acknowledged that
Lilly had questioned the continuing reliance on this exception as a basis for
admission in the absence of cross-examination of accomplice statements, 280
but its continued reliance on Lilly demonstrates the Supreme Court‘s
somewhat reluctant but gradual path toward renunciation of the Roberts
rationale when applied to this category of hearsay.
The significance of Crawford for Earnest was both theoretical and
practical. In theory, Crawford affirmed precisely the argument Earnest had
advanced in attacking the reliability of his conviction based on Boeglin‘s
statement to police. Boeglin‘s statement clearly constituted the type of
testimonial statement Crawford addressed directly. Like Sylvia‘s statement,
Boeglin‘s statement to investigating officers was the type of statement
designed for use in an official proceeding for proof of a fact.281
Without the opportunity to cross-examine Boeglin before the jury, Earnest
was denied the only meaningful opportunity to test the credibility of Boeglin‘s
factual disclosures to the police or to question his motivation for implicating
Earnest before the trial jury, which would have been in the best position to
assess Boeglin‘s personal credibility and the reliability of his claims.
Practically, Crawford gave Earnest another opportunity to litigate. But
the litigation option was limited to New Mexico state court proceedings under
Rule 5-802, which authorizes state post-conviction litigation challenging the
legality of conviction. 282 The New Mexico procedure does not limit
applications for post-conviction relief, affording Earnest the option of filing a
second petition for habeas relief even though he had previously raised his
alternative state constitutional argument in a first petition for habeas corpus. 283
Ironically, even though Earnest was relying on the interpretation of a
federal constitutional protection in an intervening decision of the United
States Supreme Court, he would not have been permitted to raise the claim
based on Crawford in a federal habeas action for at least three reasons. First,
the federal statute imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal habeas
277. State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699 (N.M. 2004).
278. Id. at 706–07.
279. Id. at 706.
280. Id.
281. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (―An accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark
to an acquaintance does not.‖).
282. N.M. R. CRIM. P. FOR THE DIST. CTS. 5-802.
283. See id.

2008]

CRAWFORD AND RETROACTIVITY

271

claims284—long passed for Earnest—in contrast to the New Mexico
procedure, which includes no limitations period. 285 Second, the application of
the Teague new rules doctrine prevented the application of Crawford in the
federal habeas process until such time as the Supreme Court announced that
the new rule was to be applied retroactively. 286 And third, even had Crawford
been afforded retrospective application at the time it was announced, the
federal habeas statute specifically excludes application of the newly
announced retroactive rule to a litigant whose claim was previously asserted
in a federal habeas proceeding. 287
Because of the latitude recognized by Rule 5-802 governing state postconviction proceedings, the Court‘s reversal of the Ohio v. Roberts reliability
doctrine in Crawford opened the door for reconsideration of the constitutional
legality of Earnest‘s conviction. The state court had already determined that
admission of Boeglin‘s statement was critical to conviction. 288 Thus, the only
issue to be addressed in Earnest‘s second state post-conviction proceeding
was whether Crawford should be applied to afford Earnest relief from his
conviction.
A. Crawford and Retroactivity
Retroactive application of Crawford proved an immediate issue for
litigation for Earnest and other defendants whose convictions rested on the
284. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
285. N.M. R. CRIM. P. FOR THE DIST. CTS. 5-802.
286. E.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) (―The nonretroactivity principle
prevents a federal court from granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a rule
announced after his conviction and sentence became final.‖).
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), (b)(2)(A) (2000). Subsection (b)(1) provides: ―A claim
presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented
in a prior application shall be dismissed.‖ Subsection (b)(2)(A) provides:
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under
section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless—
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable . . . .
Thus, it appears that a litigant who correctly anticipated a change in the law in arguing his claim in a
prior federal habeas action is denied the benefit of a new rule subsequently recognized by the
Supreme Court and given retroactive application. In light of the specific language of subsection (b),
had Crawford been afforded retroactive application, Earnest would not have been entitled to rely on
that retroactive application precisely because he had challenged his conviction in an earlier petition.
See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1130–34 (10th Cir. 1996) (asserting the same argument
ultimately resulting in the change in the law announced later in Crawford).
288. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 876 (N.M. 1985) (terming admission of
Boeglin‘s statement ―highly prejudicial‖).

272

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:231

admission of inculpatory statements made by accomplices not subjected to
cross-examination.
1. Retroactive Application as an Exception to Teague‘s New Rules Doctrine
A number of circuits considered the question of retroactivity in light of the
principles set out in Teague v. Lane,289 with typically unsuccessful results for
litigants seeking to reopen convictions based upon the prosecution‘s use of
uncrossed accomplice testimony. The Tenth Circuit rejected retroactive
application in Brown v. Uphoff,290 as did the Second Circuit in Mungo v.
Duncan.291 An Eighth Circuit panel opined in dicta that Crawford would not
apply retroactively, 292 while the First Circuit declined to reach the issue. 293
Only the Ninth Circuit, in Bockting v. Bayer,294 held that Crawford should be
applied retroactively prior to the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s disposition. 295
At the point at which certiorari had been granted by the Supreme Court in
Bockting,296 the Nevada attorney general could point to substantial authority
rejecting retroactive application of Crawford in the federal circuits and state
appellate courts.297

289. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
290. 381 F.3d 1219, 1225–27 (10th Cir. 2004).
291. 393 F.3d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 2004).
292. Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444–45 (8th Cir. 2004).
293. Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir. 2004).
294. 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit panel opinion was issued on February
22, 2005. The petition for rehearing, en banc, was denied by that court on August 11, 2005. 418
F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2005). State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest was argued in the New Mexico Supreme
Court on May 11, 2005.
295. Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1012–13.
296. Whorton v. Bockting, 547 U.S. 1127 (2006) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). In an
unusual irony, Bockting successfully petitioned the Court for certiorari following affirmance of his
conviction on direct appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court. Bockting v. Bayer, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).
The Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826–
27 (1990), in which the Court had held that admission of certain statements made by children relating
to sexual abuse violated the Confrontation Clause where the statements were made in response to
questioning and offered as an exception to the hearsay rule. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173,
1178 n.2 (2007). On remand, the state supreme court found no violation under Wright, again
affirming. Bockting v. State, 847 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Nev. 1993). Once Bockting was forced to
litigate the claim in federal habeas corpus, the Teague prohibition on the announcement of new rules
in that process barred the lower federal courts from affording relief in the absence of a declaration of
retroactive application for Crawford which was issued years later, in 2004. See Bockting, 127 S. Ct.
at 1178 n.2.
297. See Petitioner‘s Brief on the Merits at 15, Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (No. 05-595), 2006
WL 2066492.
[A] growing number of circuit courts of appeal, now numbering six, have held
that Crawford is not retroactive. Lave v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2006);
Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d
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The argument that Crawford addressed an issue to which the Teague
retroactivity limitation should not apply was predicated on the significance
attached to the cross-examination right in the guilt or innocence
determination.298 In Teague v. Lane, the Court recognized two classes of
exceptions to the usual operation of the non-retroactivity principle generally
attending articulation of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure. 299
The first accords retroactive application to new rules that restrict the authority
of government to proscribe particular types of conduct. 300 For instance, the
Court‘s rulings that certain mentally retarded individuals 301 and juveniles
under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense302 cannot be executed
consistent with Eighth Amendment commands fit this exception and require
retroactive application.
The second exception provides for retroactive application of new rules
that are said to be ―implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.‖ 303 The Court
explained that the class of rules fitting within this exception is that which
ensures fundamental fairness and accuracy in the fact-finding process.304 The
Teague Court had recognized the possibility that a newly articulated rule of
constitutional criminal procedure could be deemed so fundamental to the

859 (7th Cir. 2005); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2005); Mungo v.
Duncan, 393 F.3d 327 (2d Cir. 2004); Espy v. Massac, 443 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir.
2
2006). The two circuit courts that considered the retroactivity of Crawford
after the Ninth Circuit‘s Bockting decision explicitly rejected that court‘s
holding. Espy, 443 F.3d at 1367; Lave, 444 F.3d. at 336. ―The two judge
Bockting majority thus stands alone in its conviction that Crawford applied
retroactively.‖ JA 223 (O‘Scannlain, J. dissenting).
2. In addition, an ever expanding number of State appellate courts have
held that Crawford is not retroactive to cases on collateral review: Drach v.
Bruce, [136] P. 3d [390], (Kan. 2006); Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977
(Colo. 2006); Chandler v. Crosby, 916 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2005); In re Moore,
[34] Cal. Rptr. [3d 605], (Cal. App., 4th Dist., Div. 1 2005); Danforth v.
State, 700 N.W. 2d 530 (Minn. App. 2005); In re Markel, 154 Wash. 2d
262, 111 P.3d 249 (2005); State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa 2005);
People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118 (Colo. App. 2004); but see, State v.
Forbes, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005) (retroactive under ―unique facts and
procedural posture‖).
Id.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989).
Id. at 311.
Id.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 312–13.
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accuracy of fact-finding in the trial process that it represents a ―watershed‖
rule of criminal process.305
In arguing that Crawford constituted such a watershed rule, proponents of
retroactive application could point to Justice Scalia‘s characterization of the
fundamental purpose of the cross-examination right as implicit in the
confrontation guarantee:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think
the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment‘s protection
to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to
amorphous notions of ―reliability.‖ . . . Admitting statements
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the
right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause‘s ultimate goal
is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence
be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.306
If cross-examination is essential to the process by which the determination of
reliability is to be made, then, arguably, Crawford constituted a watershed
rule of criminal procedure, unlike rules merely prophylactic in nature. For
example, in a case in which retroactivity might have been assumed, Ring v.
Arizona,307 involving the role of the jury in finding the existence of
aggravating circumstances warranting consideration or imposition of a death
sentence, 308 the underlying principle did not require retroactive application. 309
But subsequently in Schriro v. Summerlin,310 the Court rejected retroactive
application of Ring to vacate death sentences imposed under sentencing
schemes comparable to those rejected in Ring.311 The Court‘s reasoning was
that the actual sentencing procedure used, where a trial judge, rather than the
jury, found aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the death penalty,
did not necessarily implicate the accuracy of the fact-finding process.312 The
Apprendi-Ring rationale, itself grounded in Sixth Amendment protections, did

305. E.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (noting a ―watershed‖ rule implicates ―the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding‖).
306. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
307. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
308. Id. at 589.
309. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 (2000).
310. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
311. Id. at 358.
312. Id. at 355–56.
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not meet the requirement for a watershed rule as contemplated by Teague‘s
second exception.313
In contrast, the cross-examination right bears directly on the accuracy of
fact-finding, particularly by jurors who will assess the credibility of a
witness‘s testimony in part, at least, by observing the witness‘s demeanor
while testifying. Observation of the witness is a factor used by jurors in
determining the weight given to the witness‘s testimony that cannot be
provided by reference to probable reliability based upon factors indicating the
likely credibility of a declarant‘s out-of-court statements.
This reasoning was sufficiently convincing to generate limited support in
the federal courts considering the question of retroactive application of
Crawford. Judge Clay of the Sixth Circuit,314 Judge DeMoss of the Fifth, 315
and Judge McKeown of the Ninth316 all issued separate opinions accepting the
argument that Crawford had announced not only a new rule, but also one of
watershed character that warranted retroactive application. Judge DeMoss
concluded, ―Without confrontation in such cases, the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished.‖ 317 Judge McKeown similarly observed
that ―the Crawford rule is one without which the likelihood of accurate
conviction is seriously diminished.‖318
Unfortunately for litigants relying on retroactive application of Crawford
as a basis for post-conviction relief, the argument that its rule was of
watershed dimension and thus entitled to retroactive application would fail to
persuade the Supreme Court.
2. Crawford as a Restorative Decision Rather than a New Rules Decision
The difficulty imposed by the narrow second Teague exception to the
retroactivity bar suggested an alternative view of Crawford, one in which the
decision does not constitute a new rule at all. Rather, because the Court
characterized its previous decisions straying from the strict protections
afforded by the Confrontation Clause as having been reached in error, Earnest
argued that rather than a new rule, Crawford actually represented a restoration
of the prior precedent in Douglas v. Alabama to pre-eminence in questions

313. Id. at 355–58.
314. Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 811 (6th Cir. 2006) (Clay, J., concurring). The panel
applied pre-Crawford confrontation law to grant relief. Id. at 811 (noting that a prior panel had
rejected the Crawford retroactivity argument in Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005)).
315. Lave v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
316. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2005), petition for reh’g en banc
denied, 418 F.3d 1055, rev’d, Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
317. Lave, 444 F.3d at 337 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).
318. Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1021.
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pertaining to accomplice statements. 319 In this sense, the Court simply reimposed a rule dictated by precedent. Under Teague, rules dictated by
precedent are not new and thus not subject to its restrictive retroactivity
doctrine. 320
Earnest argued that Crawford actually involved the affirmation of longstanding constitutional doctrine, as reflected in the majority‘s
characterization: ―We do not read the historical sources to say that a prior
opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, rather than a necessary,
condition for admissibility of testimonial statements. They suggest that this
requirement was dispositive, and not merely one of several ways to establish
reliability.‖321 The majority then applied this conclusion to reach the core of
its holding: ―Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers‘
understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have
been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.‖322 This language
suggests anything but that the rule articulated in Crawford was new, and its
significance is ultimately suggested by the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s
decision granting Earnest relief. 323 The New Mexico court treated Crawford
as not announcing a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure: ―Applying
the Teague analysis to this case, we conclude that as to the unique facts and
procedural posture of Earnest‘s case, Crawford does not announce a new rule
because the result was ‗dictated by precedent existing at the time‘ we
[initially] decided Earnest.‖324
But this argument found little support elsewhere. 325 Only Judge Noonan,
concurring in Bockting v. Bayer in the Ninth Circuit,326 would adopt this
rationale to find that the Crawford holding was entitled to retroactive
application.327

319. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 147 (N.M. 2005).
320. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
321. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55–56 (2004).
322. Id. at 59.
323. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 147–49.
324. Id. at 147.
325. A similar argument was made by the habeas petitioner in People v. Flowers, 561 N.E.2d
674, 683 (Ill. 1990), in arguing that the state court had not announced a new rule but simply
reinterpreted an existing provision of law, essentially correcting an erroneous view. The court
rejected this argument, finding that it had, in fact, announced a new rule governing the proper burden
of proof when a jury is instructed on a lesser-included offense of manslaughter in a murder
prosecution in People v. Reddick, 526 N.E.2d 141 (Ill. 1988). Flowers, 561 N.E.2d at 680–83.
326. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (Noonan, J., concurring).
327. Id. at 1023. Judge Noonan concluded: ―Crawford, therefore, does not announce a new
rule. Retroactivity is not an issue.‖ Id.
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B. The Application of Crawford in Earnest
In Crawford, the Court ultimately addressed precisely the issue argued in
New Mexico v. Earnest and addressed by Justice Rehnquist in his concurring
opinion,328 in which he asserted that the Court‘s reasoning in Ohio v. Roberts
and holding in Lee had effectively overruled Douglas v. Alabama by
implication.329 Despite the fact that Crawford revisited the issue in Earnest,
the petitioner‘s brief in Crawford did not mention the Court‘s disposition in
Earnest or Justice Rehnquist‘s influential concurrence. 330 Nor did petitioner‘s
brief331 mention Williamson v. United States,332 in which the Court held that
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which permits the admission of hearsay
statements against the declarant‘s penal interest, ―does not allow admission of
non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader
narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.‖333 Similarly, an amicus brief filed
on behalf of law professors did not mention New Mexico v. Earnest334 but did
cite Williamson,335 noting the ability to restrict admission of accomplice
statements on evidentiary grounds without reaching the constitutional issue. 336
Neither the ACLU‘s amicus brief337 nor the Solicitor General‘s brief 338
mentioned Earnest or discussed Justice Rehnquist‘s concurrence.
1. Earnest‘s Retroactivity Argument
In the Earnest litigation, the State argued vigorously that the state‘s courts
were bound to apply Crawford only in conformity with Teague
retroactivity.339 Relying on federal circuit decisions holding that Crawford
should not be applied retroactively—decisions correctly anticipating the

328. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
329. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 649–50 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
330. Brief for Petitioner at iv–v, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940.
331. Id. at vii.
332. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
333. Id. at 600–01.
334. Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors Sherman J. Clark et
al. in Support of Petitioner at iv, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754958.
335. Id. at 29 n.18.
336. Id.
337. Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae Nat‘l Ass‘n of
Criminal Def. Lawyers, the ACLU and the ACLU of Wash. in Support of Petitioner at iv, Crawford,
541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961.
338. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at v, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410),
2003 WL 22228005.
339. Response to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1–5, State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54
(N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 1, 2004).
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Supreme Court‘s determination in Whorton v. Bockting—the State argued that
Earnest could not be afforded the benefit of Crawford retrospectively.340
Earnest argued that regardless of whether the United States Supreme
Court ultimately ruled favorably with regard to his reliance on Crawford on
the retroactivity issue or the new rule issue, the New Mexico Supreme Court
was entitled to apply state law retroactivity principles in deciding whether he
should benefit from Crawford.341 Earnest argued that New Mexico law,
however, required retroactive application of Crawford as a matter of state
law. 342
In this latter respect Earnest relied on state retroactivity principles in
arguing for application of Crawford on the facts of his case and conviction. 343
New Mexico had adopted a broad approach to retroactive application of
decisions recognizing new causes of action or procedural rights in Beavers v.
Johnson Controls World Services.344 There, the New Mexico Supreme Court
had applied the broadest approach to retroactivity in recognizing a new cause
of action sounding in tort for discriminatory practices in employment.345 The
court held that the right to bring an action would apply retroactively even to
acts that occurred prior to recognition of the cause of action. 346
Earnest argued that retroactivity of criminal decisions should be coextensive with that afforded in civil matters and persist in that position. 347 On
the federal level, civil and criminal retroactivity doctrines are comparable. In
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,348 the Supreme Court harmonized
the retroactivity doctrine applicable in civil litigation with that already in
place for criminal litigation in Griffith v. Kentucky.349 Griffith drew a bright
line for retroactivity analysis, holding that new rules of constitutional criminal
procedure would apply to all cases pending on direct appeal in which the
question had been preserved for appellate review when the new rule is
announced by the Court.350 Harper applied this same general principle to

340. State of New Mexico‘s Verified Petition for Stay of Order Granting Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, State v. Earnest, No. 29,111 (N.M. Feb. 28, 2005).
341. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 29, at 18–19.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. 881 P.2d 1376, 1377 n.1, 1386–87 (1994).
345. Id. at 1386–87.
346. Id.
347. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 29, at 18–19; see Jackson v. State, 925
P.2d 1195, 1196 (N.M. 1996).
348. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
349. 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987).
350. Id.
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civil matters 351 and in so doing, set the constitutional floor for application of
new rules of law as a matter of due process.
Earnest argued that the same principle of symmetry should be formally
applied with respect to civil and criminal retroactivity principles under New
Mexico law. Because New Mexico had already recognized that Crawford
applies to New Mexico prosecutions as a matter of federal constitutional
law, 352 he argued that the retroactivity issue was properly presented to the trial
court in Earnest‘s petition for habeas relief.
2. The Unique Procedural Posture of Earnest
The state supreme court‘s disposition of Earnest‘s post-conviction claim
was itself somewhat rare. Earnest initially filed for post-conviction relief
directly in the high court,353 arguing that all factual issues necessary for
resolution of the legal issues had already been resolved in the direct appeal
litigation in Earnest I354 and II.355 The supreme court remanded the cause to
the district court of conviction.356 The trial court issued its decision 357 and
entered an order granting the writ of habeas corpus. 358 When the State filed
for a stay of the trial court‘s order,359 the supreme court ordered Earnest to file
a response to the State‘s petition, restyling the petition for stay as a petition
for writ of superintending control sua sponte. 360 Consequently, Earnest‘s case
was styled State v. Forbes361 ex rel. Earnest,362 rather than State v. Earnest.
351. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
352. See generally State v. Johnson, 98 P.3d 998 (N.M. 2004).
353. Earnest v. State, No. 28,864 (N.M. Aug. 24, 2004) (order granting motion for leave to file
petition for writ of habeas corpus); see N.M. R. CRIM. P. FOR THE DIST. CTS. 5-802.
354. See 703 P.2d 872 (N.M. 1985).
355. See 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987).
356. Earnest v. State, No. 28,864 (N.M. Sept. 29, 2004).
357. State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist Ct. Jan. 11, 2005) (deciding the writ of
habeas corpus should be granted).
358. State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 15, 2005) (order granting the
writ of habeas corpus); see State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 145 (N.M. 2005). The trial
court specifically recognized the State‘s right to appeal from this order: ―10. The Writ of Habeas
Corpus should be granted. The State of New Mexico is allowed 15 days to file their Requested
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in 30 days be permitted to Appeal this Court‘s
Decision.‖ State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54, slip op. at 10 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 11, 2005).
The State failed to file a timely notice of appeal, however, as its notice of appeal was not filed until
March 15, 2005, beyond the thirty days permitted for the filing of the notice of appeal under Rule 12201E of the New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure.
359. State of New Mexico‘s Verified Petition for Stay of Order Granting Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, supra note 340.
360. State v. Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Mar. 2, 2005) (order granting request for stay); State v.
Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Mar. 2, 2005) (order granting motion to request a response to the petition
for writ of superintending control). The writ of superintending control is the device by which the
New Mexico Supreme Court regulates practice in the district courts. Dist. Ct. for the 2d Jud. Dist. v.
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3. The Earnest Court‘s Resolution of the Retroactivity Question
In ordering relief on Earnest‘s state habeas corpus claim, the New Mexico
Supreme Court fashioned a remedy designed to afford him the retroactive
benefit of Crawford‘s changed view of confrontation—whether that change is
characterized as a matter of error correction or the announcement of a new
rule—but designed to limit its retroactive application only to Earnest. The
court was very careful in its explanation of its holding, saying:
Granting Earnest a new trial is consistent with our
responsibility ―to do justice to each litigant on the merits of
his own case.‖ Our decision is limited to the very special
facts of this case, highlighted by the fact that the very law this
Court applied to Earnest‘s case twenty years ago has now
been vindicated, which entitles him now to the same new trial
he should have received back then. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court, lift the stay, and remand for execution of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, affording the State the opportunity to
retry Earnest.363
The decision rests on principles implicated, but never directly addressed, in
the Crawford and Bockting litigation, including the issue of whether states

McKenna, 881 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1994). The court has described its power to issue the writ in broad
terms:
The power of superintending control is an extraordinary power. It is hampered
by no specific rules or means for its exercise. It is so general and
comprehensive that its complete and full extent and use have practically hitherto
not been fully and completely known and exemplified. It is unlimited, being
bounded only by the exigencies which call for its exercise.
State v. Roy, 60 P.2d 646, 662 (N.M. 1936) (emphasis added). The court has looked to five criteria
in determining whether the writ of superintending control is appropriate:
It is the settled law of this jurisdiction that the writ of supervisory control will
issue only when a ruling, order, or decision of an inferior court, within its
jurisdiction, (1) is erroneous; (2) is arbitrary or tyrannical; (3) does gross
injustice to the petitioner; (4) may result in irreparable injury to the petitioner;
(5) and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than by issuance of
the writ.
Albuquerque Gas & Elec. Co. v. Curtis, 89 P.2d 615, 619 (N.M. 1936).
361. The Honorable Jay W. Forbes, District Judge, Fifth Judicial District.
362. See State v. Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Mar. 21, 2005) (order granting motion to request a
reply to the response to the petition for writ of superintending control); see also Forbes, 119 P.3d
144.
363. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 148–49 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)) (citation omitted).
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were limited by the parameters of Teague in affording retroactive application
to decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court announcing new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure. 364
First, while the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized the significance
of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Teague, 365 it did not conclude that Teague
was controlling on the question of the court‘s consideration of Crawford in
terms of Earnest‘s claim for relief. 366 Instead, the state court essentially
adopted Earnest‘s argument that Crawford did not announce a new rule of
constitutional criminal procedure at all.367 Rather, it concluded that Crawford
simply restored the principle of Douglas v. Alabama.368 The court reached
this conclusion by noting that neither the Crawford majority nor it, in its prior
decision State v. Johnson369 recognizing and applying Crawford in New
Mexico prosecutions, had made an explicit determination that the holding in
Crawford constituted a new rule. 370
Once the supreme court concluded that Crawford did not announce a new
rule, it was positioned to afford Earnest relief from his conviction without
addressing the question of retroactivity broadly. In this sense, the decision
leaves open the very important question of whether other litigants are entitled
to the benefit of an application that restores the precedential power of a prior
decision, rather than representing the true break with precedent that the
federal doctrine uses to describe new rules. But Forbes did not address the
retroactivity, generally, of a decision that changes the law but does so by
restoring improperly neglected or avoided precedent.
Because the case arose in the context of an extraordinary proceeding,
however, the court likely reserved to itself the option of determining which
other litigants, if any, could demonstrate the factual scenario warranting the
exercise of the court‘s authority to grant relief. Thus, rather than adopting a
broad policy of retroactivity under New Mexico law or in not applying any
policy of retroactivity that would have general application in state

364. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d
1010 (9th Cir. 2005).
365. See Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146–47. The court cited State v. Mascarenas, 4 P.3d 1221, 1228
(N.M. 2000), which had cited Teague, for the proposition that the determination of whether a new
rule should be applied retroactively initially required consideration of whether the rule announced
was in fact new.
366. See Forbes, 119 P.3d at 147.
367. Id.
368. Id. (referring to 380 U.S. 415 (1965)).
369. See generally 98 P.3d 998 (N.M. 2004).
370. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146–47.
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proceedings, the court ordered relief based on ―the unique facts and
procedural circumstances of this case.‖371
But the court‘s reliance on State v. Ulibarri372 suggests that it did not
consider itself bound by Teague as a limiting rule on the potential extension
of retroactive benefit from a Supreme Court decision as a matter of state
retroactivity doctrine. 373 In Ulibarri, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
explained its exercise of the option to apply decisions retroactively or
prospectively only374 within the framework of Linkletter v. Walker.375 In
Linkletter, the United States Supreme Court had advanced a test for flexibility
in the retroactivity determination, requiring the issuing court to determine
both the policy and practice implications involved in extending the retroactive
benefit of new rules to defendants whose cases had been litigated under
previous rules. 376 The court of appeals had determined that a new rule of
procedure governing grand jury practice would apply to all cases then pending
in the state‘s grand juries or untried on grand jury indictments, which had not
been obtained in compliance with the rule. 377 The supreme court affirmed the
prospective application of the rule on certiorari.378
The court of appeals opinion in Ulibarri discloses, however, uncertainty
about the continuing viability of Linkletter analysis as a retroactivity doctrine
under state law.379 But the court noted that the supreme court in Santillanes v.
State380 continued to invoke Linkletter, even after that approach had been
abandoned by the plurality in Teague.381 The court‘s observation may identify
a lingering uncertainty about the extent to which state retroactivity doctrine
should or must reflect federal principles, or simply track the supreme court‘s
determination to apply retroactivity principles in a manner consistent with the
court‘s concern for pursuit of justice in individual cases. This latter approach
may also be seen in Jackson v. State,382 where the court quoted with approval
the following language from a Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v.
371. Id. at 149.
372. 994 P.2d 1164 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
373. See Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146–47.
374. See Ulibarri, 994 P.2d at 1171–72 (―Our understanding of these cases is that reviewing
courts should carefully weigh the effects of their rulings in light of the three factors recognized in
Linkletter.‖).
375. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
376. See id. at 627.
377. Ulibarri, 994 P.2d at 1172.
378. State v. Ulibarri, 997 P.2d 818, 819 (N.M. 2000).
379. See Ulibarri, 994 P.2d at 1171.
380. 849 P.2d 358, 367 (N.M. 1993) (noting that courts have inherent power to give their
rulings prospective or retroactive application).
381. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
382. 925 P.2d 1195 (N.M. 1996).
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Harper:383 ―Generally, where the purpose of a new constitutional doctrine is
to cure a defect in the criminal procedure which impairs the truth finding
function, and thus raises doubt as to the validity of the guilty verdict, the rule
will be given full retroactive effect.‖384
In Earnest, the court rejected reliance on authority permitting admission
of a testimonial statement made by an accomplice without the defendant being
afforded an opportunity to test the reliability of the statement by crossexamination.385 Because such statements have historically been characterized
as presumptively unreliable as a result of the accomplice‘s motive to shift
blame or negotiate favorable treatment in return for the statement, convictions
resting on these statements implicitly raise issues of the accuracy of the factfinding function and reliability of the verdict. 386 Crawford corrected that error
in the Court‘s confrontation jurisprudence; in Forbes, the court applied the
correction for Earnest‘s benefit.
Within the factual context of Earnest II, the supreme court‘s
understanding of what constitutes a new rule proved to be particularly
important. In Mascarenas, the court had observed: ―‗To put it differently, a
case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing
at the time the defendant‘s conviction became final.‘‖ 387 The Forbes majority
focused on the rules applicable at the time of Earnest‘s trial in holding that the
court had been correct in Earnest I in applying Douglas as the basis for
reversal of the conviction. 388 Finding that the Earnest I court had essentially
been vindicated by Crawford, the Forbes majority concluded that Crawford
had not announced a new rule at all but merely restored Douglas to its
controlling position as authority regarding admissibility of uncrossed
accomplice statements.389 The Forbes majority noted: ―The New Mexico
Supreme Court was correct to follow Douglas, which we believe the analysis
in Crawford now confirms.‖390
Justice Serna, in dissent, focused on the finality of the conviction at the
time of the change in law.391 For him, and consistent with the Court‘s
383. 516 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1986).
384. Jackson, 925 P.2d at 1196 (quoting Harper, 516 A.2d at 323).
385. See State v. Earnest (Earnest II), 744 P.2d 539, 539–40 (N.M. 1987).
386. Id. at 540.
387. State v. Mascarenas, 4 P.3d 1221, 1229 (N.M. 2000) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 301 (1989)).
388. State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 147 (N.M. 2005).
389. Id. (―In any event, it cannot be disputed that Douglas, which held that an accomplice
statement was inadmissible unless the defendant had a right to cross-examine, was good law at the
time we decided Earnest I.‖) (citations omitted).
390. Id. (referring to Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), and Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
391. Id. at 150 (Serna, J., dissenting).
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characterization of the ―direct appeal‖ as concluding with certiorari
proceedings, Earnest‘s conviction was not actually final until the court‘s
reversal was vacated in New Mexico v. Earnest.392 Thus, he found no
unfairness in the fact that Earnest was tried under a different rule than that
ultimately applied following remand by the Supreme Court.393 But for the
Forbes majority, this change in the rules of admissibility for confrontation
purposes after the fact of Earnest‘s trial was not acceptable. The majority
stressed the fact that Earnest had asserted reliance on his right to crossexamine Boeglin, consistent with Douglas, throughout the litigation.394
Thus, the disposition in Forbes rests less on doctrinal analysis or concern
for development of retroactivity principles assuring uniformity in application
and more on the court‘s perception of the particular unfairness in Earnest‘s
conviction. The court carefully maintained its discretion not to announce a
general doctrinal position on retroactivity with respect to the Crawford rule in
resolving the precise issue Earnest brought before it. Moreover, the majority
opinion clearly suggests that the court believed the Supreme Court had, in
fact, gotten it wrong in New Mexico v. Earnest in vacating the state court‘s
reversal of Earnest‘s conviction. This is evident in the majority‘s conclusion:
―Our decision is limited to the very special facts of this case, highlighted by
the fact that the very law this Court applied to Earnest‘s case twenty years ago
has now been vindicated, which entitles him now to the same new trial he
should have received back then.‖395
In fact, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s characterization of
Crawford as involving restoration of the pre-existing precedent of Douglas v.
Alabama, rather than announcing a new rule within the Teague framework,
also proved to be incorrect.
The New Mexico court did not apply the retroactivity analysis that would
be expected had Crawford not announced a new rule of constitutional
criminal procedure. Had the result in Crawford been dictated by existing
precedent consistent with the Teague analytical framework, 396 it would have
been afforded full retroactive benefit.397 The consequence would have been
392. Id.
393. Id. at 150–51.
394. Id. at 147 (majority opinion).
395. Id. at 148–49.
396. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (―[A] case announces a new rule if the result
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant‘s conviction was final.‖).
397. For example, in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), the Court applied the Teague
approach in concluding that a rule previously applied in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988), and Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), was dictated by existing precedent holding
that imposition of the death penalty based, in part, on a finding that the capital murder was
committed in an ―especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel‖ manner was impermissible because of the
lack of definition for this characterization that would permit jurors to differentiate rationally between
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dramatic for the criminal justice system because, presumably, all convictions
resting on admission of uncrossed testimonial statements would have been
subject to vacation and the cases remanded for new trials. Of course, this
presupposes that in each individual case, the defense had preserved error by
objection to the admission of the statement, and its admission of uncrossed
statements would have been prejudicial to the defense under the Chapman v.
California398 harmlessness standard. Under Chapman, the burden is placed on
the prosecution to demonstrate that constitutional trial error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to avoid reversal.399
The Court‘s view of whether decisions are dictated by existing precedent
is narrow, and must be, in order to avoid the prospect that all new applications
of constitutional protections would require review of all prior convictions or
sentences in which a similar issue had been raised, requiring then a
preservation and prejudice analysis in each case. With regard to Crawford
error, however, the actual number of cases in which relief might ultimately be
granted would likely be small, if only suggested by the sampling of decisions
referred to by Justice Scalia in which convictions had been obtained based on
admission of uncrossed accomplice statements. 400
Consequently, the New Mexico court‘s approach is not clearly one of new
or existing rules analysis based on Teague precisely because the court did not
hold that its retroactive application of Crawford in Earnest‘s case represented
a general grant of retroactivity. 401 Instead, the court tempered its initial
finding with its second concern—that at the time of Earnest‘s trial, existing
precedent did preclude admission of Boeglin‘s uncrossed statement to police,
as it had held in Earnest I, relying on Douglas v. Alabama.402
In this very important sense, the court‘s decision in Forbes is not so much
about the retroactivity implications of Crawford, but about the fundamental
fairness of the trial process being compromised by a post-trial decision
essentially changing the rules of trial in a way that neither Earnest nor trial
counsel could have reasonably expected when the case was tried.
A reading of the limited holding in Forbes suggests, therefore, that New
Mexico defendants tried after the Supreme Court‘s remand in New Mexico v.
Earnest and the state supreme court‘s application of Ohio v. Roberts in
Earnest II to uphold the conviction, were not unfairly prejudiced by the
those capital offenses that were committed in such a fashion and other capital offenses that would not
qualify for imposition of the death penalty. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 228, 237 (citation omitted).
398. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
399. Id. at 24.
400. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–65 (2004) (noting a dozen or so cases); see
Kirst, supra note 251, at 104–06 (documenting Lilly-based confession claims).
401. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 148–49 (N.M. 2005).
402. Id. at 147.
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Supreme Court‘s temporary abandonment of Douglas. Instead, they were on
notice that uncrossed accomplice statements would be admissible if found to
possess sufficient indications of reliability—the chief indicator being that they
were made against the accomplice‘s penal interest—and thus defense counsel
had the opportunity to creatively challenge the reliability analysis or consider
other tactical options. Of course, these options were likely proved to be futile
against the overwhelming power of the admissions made by accomplices
implicating the defendants on trial.
V. BOCKTING AND DANFORTH: RESOLUTION OF CRAWFORD-RELATED
RETROACTIVITY QUESTIONS
The resolution of the question of retroactive application of Crawford by
the United States Supreme Court not only affected litigants raising Crawfordbased confrontation claims, but also generated an additional and far broader
issue: whether states not only are required to apply retroactive federal
constitutional rules to benefit state court litigants, but also are bound to afford
no greater retroactive application than that announced by the Supreme Court.
A. The Rejection of Crawford Retroactivity: Whorton v. Bockting
A unanimous Supreme Court declined to afford Crawford retroactive
application in addressing the issue squarely in Whorton v. Bockting.403 As a
threshold matter, the Court rejected the position taken by the New Mexico
Supreme Court that viewed Crawford as a decision restoring a previous rule
rather than a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure. 404 Bockting had
argued in the alternative, relying on both the McKeown 405 and Noonan
opinions406 in his Ninth Circuit victory.407 The Court rejected the restoration
argument, premised on the argument that Crawford was dictated by precedent,
first defining its terms: ―A new rule is defined as ‗a rule that . . . was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant‘s conviction became
final.‘‖408 Concluding that Ohio v. Roberts was the existing precedent, it

403. 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
404. Id. at 1181.
405. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2005) (McKeown, J.), rev’d sub
nom, Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). Judge Wallace, concurring and dissenting,
agreed with Judge McKeown that Crawford announced a new rule but disagreed that it represented a
watershed rule warranting retroactive application. Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1024, 1028–29 (Wallace, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
406. Id. at 1022–24 (Noonan, J., concurring).
407. Id. at 1020–23 (majority opinion).
408. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1181 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (internal
citations and quotation omitted)).
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concluded that Crawford was ―flatly inconsistent‖ with Roberts and, thus,
could not be dictated by Roberts.409
The Court was certainly correct in this conclusion, but the argument
advanced by Bockting and Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit was slightly
different than that argued by Earnest and adopted by the New Mexico court in
Forbes. In the Earnest litigation, Crawford is viewed as a corrective ruling
dictated by the precedent of Douglas v. Alabama.410 Justice Scalia‘s own
admission of error on the part of the Court in departing from the Douglas
principle in Roberts changed the retroactivity question because, in fact,
Crawford was dictated by Douglas, Roberts being in error.411 Moreover,
neither Roberts nor certainly Lee v. Illinois412 expressly overruled Douglas in
the process of the erroneous development of confrontation doctrine, 413 such
that it is simplistic to say that Roberts was actually the controlling precedent
for Crawford‘s claim at all.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia observed that the Court had consistently
looked to cross-examination in the admissibility analysis for out-of-court
statements, pointing out the Court‘s exclusion of uncrossed accomplice
confessions:
We similarly excluded accomplice confessions where the
defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine. See Roberts
v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294–295 (1968) (per curiam);
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126–128 (1968);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–420 (1965). In
contrast, we considered reliability factors beyond prior
opportunity for cross-examination when the hearsay
statement at issue was not testimonial. 414
In fact, the Court had never expressly approved the admission of a nontestifying accomplice‘s confession as direct evidence against the accused
without some opportunity for cross-examination. In Roberts, the testimony
was given by a witness, not an accomplice, in a preliminary hearing where she
had been subjected to cross-examination; 415 in Lee, the conviction was
reversed based on the improper admission of the accomplice‘s statement. 416
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id.
See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 147 (N.M. 2005).
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–63 (2004).
476 U.S. 530 (1985).
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
Lee, 476 U.S. at 538–39.
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Only in Tennessee v. Street 417 had the uncrossed statement been properly
admitted according to the Court, and then only for purposes of impeachment
of the defendant‘s trial testimony, which included his claim that his own
confession had been coerced.418 The majority distinguished prior decisions
that had addressed admissibility of uncrossed statements as substantive
evidence. 419 The Court held that the use of the accomplice‘s statement to
rebut the accused‘s claim that his own confession had been coerced did not
violate Street‘s right to confrontation because the defense was able to crossexamine the sheriff who had elicited his statement 420 and jurors were
instructed as to the limited purpose for which the statement had been
admitted. 421
Of particular significance in the new rule analysis is the fact that
Crawford involved admission of an accomplice‘s statement, traditionally
viewed with suspicion,422 while Bockting involved the admission of a child‘s
report of abuse, the kind of statement that the Court has not traditionally
viewed as inherently suspect.423
Consequently, a conclusion that Crawford was dictated by precedent
would have had dramatic consequences because it would have reopened for
review all state and federal convictions obtained by prosecutors offering
uncrossed testimonial statements. This would have not only included those
statements made to police by accomplices, but also, as the litigation history

417. 471 U.S. 409 (1985).
418. Id. at 417. However, the accomplice‘s confession was clearly inculpatory as to the
accused, referring to him as an actual participant in the hanging of the victim, which the accused
denied. Id. at 412. The trial court instructed the jury that it could only consider the statement as
rebuttal to the defendant‘s denial of participation in the offense, id., but the state court had concluded
that its admission violated Street‘s right to confrontation, State v. Street, 674 S.W.2d 741, 746–47
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). It found that it was likely the jurors would consider the accomplice‘s
statement as substantive evidence of the actual events surrounding the murder. Id.
419. Street, 471 U.S. at 413.
420. Id. at 414.
421. Id. at 414–15. The Court also noted the difficulty in proving that the confession was not
coerced without reliance on the confession given by the accomplice. Id. at 415. The prosecutor used
the accomplice‘s confession essentially to corroborate admissions made in the defendant‘s own
confession and then pointed to additional facts included in the defendant‘s confession that arguably
could only have been known by someone participating in the murder. Id. at 411–12. The Court did
not discuss the traditionally ―suspect‖ nature of accomplice statements, which might have required
consideration of whether the accomplice had reason to implicate the defendant, inducing him to
confess. The defendant claimed the sheriff read the contents of the accomplice‘s statement to him
and then pressured him to confess, but the sheriff denied having done so. Id. at 411. The
accomplice‘s possible motive in identifying Street in the commission of the murder, however, could
have related to his own interest in minimizing his involvement in the crime, warranting concern that
it was suspect for that reason.
422. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
423. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357–58 (1992).
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following Crawford demonstrates, the entire range of statements admitted as
exceptions to the hearsay rule that could be fairly characterized as testimonial
in nature.424
The Bockting Court could have fashioned a rule affording retroactive
application to Crawford cases based upon the admission of accomplice
statements and their traditional characterization as unreliable, but it could not
fashion a general rule based upon Crawford‘s rejection of Ohio v. Roberts
with regard to testimonial statements without affording broader relief than the
facts in Crawford would have required. Had the Crawford Court recognized
that its rule was dictated by the precedent of Douglas v. Alabama, it could
have achieved this result without disturbing convictions resting on nonaccomplice testimonial statements admitted without opportunity for crossexamination. But the text of Crawford is not strictly limited to the
consideration of accomplice statements, the narrow constitutional context
presented by Crawford‘s fact scenario. 425 Rather, Justice Scalia was
interested in discrediting the doctrinal approach of Ohio v. Roberts, and, in so
doing, those individuals convicted on the uncrossed statements of
accomplices, traditionally recognized as inherently suspect, were eventually
denied relief when the issue of retroactivity came before the Court in
Bockting.426
Having rejected the argument that Crawford was dictated by precedent
and thus did not announce a new rule, the Court avoided the sweeping
retroactivity application that would have required extensive review of
probably hundreds, if not thousands, of convictions. The Bockting Court was
left to decide whether Crawford should be applied retroactively based on the
second Teague exception to its rule of non-retroactivity.427 The Teague Court
had explained that the class of rules fitting within the second exception is that
which ensures fundamental fairness and accuracy in the fact-finding
process.428
The Bockting Court did not find that Crawford represented the kind of
rule that is central to the accuracy of the fact-finding function.429 Justice Alito
noted language from Crawford describing the confrontation guarantee: ―To be
sure, the Clause‘s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands not that evidence
424. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (discussing the admissibility of 911
emergency call messages); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (citing cases suggesting the
range of testimonial statements).
425. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
426. See Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1184 (2007).
427. Id. at 1181.
428. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311–12 (1989).
429. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1183.
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be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in
the crucible of cross-examination.‖430 The second Teague exception does not
exclude procedural rules, of course; rather, it embraces process instead of
substance. 431 That Crawford involved a procedural rule, a mechanism
implicating the fairness of the trial process, should not have doomed it to nonretroactivity under the second exception at all.
In considering the impact of Crawford in light of the watershed rule
exception, the Court relied on its prior view that this type of rule is extremely
rare432 and unlikely to be discerned. 433 In fact, the Court noted: ―[I]n the years
since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the
requirements for watershed status.‖434 Given the Court‘s admitted history, it
was hardly surprising that it would find that Crawford did not meet the
requirements for a watershed rule under the second Teague exception.
The Court then explained that the watershed rule exception must meet two
requirements, 435 applying its analysis in Schriro v. Summerlin,436 where it had
declined to apply Ring v. Arizona437 retroactively. Even though Ring required
that a jury determination of aggravating circumstances is necessary for the
imposition of a death sentence retroactively to death sentences obtained on
findings made by trial judges, instead of capital sentencing juries,438 the
Summerlin Court rejected the argument that capital sentencing fact-finding by
judges, rather than jurors, did not compromise the integrity of the sentences
imposed. 439 First, it must address a procedure that carries with it an
―impermissibly large risk‖ of an inaccurate conviction.440 Second, it must
―‗alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the
fairness of a proceeding.‘‖441

430. Id. at 1179 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).
431. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12.
432. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (stating that the exception is ―extremely
narrow‖).
433. Id. (citing Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n.7 (2001)).
434. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1181–82 (emphasis added).
435. Id. at 1182.
436. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
437. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
438. Id.
439. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 356. The Summerlin Court held that capital sentences imposed
upon judicial finding of aggravating circumstances do not carry an ―impermissibly large risk‖ of an
inaccurate conviction. Id.
440. See id. (internal quotations omitted).
441. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S.
227, 242 (1990)).
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The Court then explained that its notion of a watershed rule is the type of
rule announced in Gideon v. Wainwright,442 which required the provision of
counsel for indigent criminal defendants and which, the Court admitted, has
repeatedly been relied on by the Court to supply guidance in its analysis of
rules claimed to satisfy the requirements of the second Teague exception. 443
Of course, virtually no rule could meet the profound implications of Gideon
for the criminal justice system, and that reality dominates the Bockting
Court‘s conclusion: ―The Crawford rule is in no way comparable to the
Gideon rule. The Crawford rule is much more limited in scope, and the
relationship of that rule to the accuracy of the fact finding process is far less
direct and profound.‖444 But in its insistence on minimizing the import of
Crawford for the fact-finding process, the Court made an unreasonable leap of
faith, misinterpreting the meaning of its holding in Crawford.
Justice Alito characterized Crawford as involving a rejection of doctrinal
analysis in Ohio v. Roberts based on its theoretical inconsistency with
historical notions of cross-examination as central to the confrontation right. 445
That characterization is no doubt correct, but only in part. To the extent that
Crawford revitalized Douglas and the similarly sound traditional view that
accomplice statements are inherently suspect and thus not inherently
trustworthy, that aspect of Crawford addresses the very heart of accuracy in
the fact-finding process. But in viewing Crawford as essentially doctrinally
correct, Justice Alito misses this aspect of the significance of the holding
based on the precise facts of Crawford. Justice Alito notes: ―Accordingly, it
is not surprising that the overall effect of Crawford with regard to the
accuracy of fact-finding in criminal cases is not easy to assess.‖ 446 When one
looks to the fact that Crawford involved admission of an uncrossed
accomplice statement, it is apparent that the difficulty in assessing the ―overall
effect of Crawford with regard to the accuracy of fact-finding‖ is not simply
the result of admission without cross-examination, but rather, the unreliability
of the statements of accomplices. 447
With regard to these inherently suspect and presumably untrustworthy
statements, the threat to the accuracy of fact-finding is implicit in their
admission without testing by cross-examination and, preferably, before the
jury. In contrast, the general doctrinal change accomplished by Crawford
does not so readily suggest impairment of fact-finding precisely because

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1182.
Id.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
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hearsay statements made by witnesses who are not accomplices are not
inherently suspect. Because they are often admitted based upon long-standing
appreciation for their likely reliability and trustworthiness, admission of these
statements without the opportunity for cross-examination may often suggest
no compromise of the integrity of the fact-finding process.
Justice Alito concluded, however, that because no uncrossed statements
would have been admissible under the Roberts framework without a reliability
determination, there is little chance that Crawford actually contributes to
reliability at all. 448 This is quite logical and probably correct with respect to
all statements except those of accomplices for which the reliability assessment
was based upon the fact that these statements were against the penal interests
of the declarants. The status of the declarant as an accomplice, however,
suggests that all statements implicating others in the commission of the
offense may be the product of some instinct or plan to shift blame or better the
position of the declarant through controlled and limited cooperation with the
authorities. 449
Returning to Gideon, Justice Alito then concluded that while Crawford is
important, it certainly does not have similar character in terms of a ―bedrock
procedural element[] that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding.‖450 Of
course, using Gideon as the benchmark for assessment does place virtually
every other procedural rule beyond the scope of watershed status precisely
because Gideon affects every criminal prosecution in which felony
punishment may be imposed. But it does not necessarily contribute at all to
the accuracy of the fact-finding process in even a majority of cases tried;
assistance of a lawyer does not guarantee a more accurate verdict in those
cases because defendants are overwhelmingly convicted at trial even when
represented by lawyers. In contrast, however, admission of accomplice
statements untested by cross-examination threatens the reliability of factfinding in all but those cases in which the evidence is overwhelming.
The Court was certainly correct in finding that Crawford does not carry
the same implications as Gideon in terms of our overall understanding of
fundamental fairness in the conduct of the criminal trial. 451 And it is also
correct in its reasoning that it is unlikely that comparable ―rights‖ remain to
be discerned that will command retroactive application under the second
Teague exception. 452

448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Id.
See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion).
Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1183 (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at 1183–84.
See id. at 1181.
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But the factual context of Crawford cannot be ignored, particularly in
contrast to the broader range of hearsay implicated by Bockting. With regard
to the specific hearsay admitted at trial in the latter—and certainly the broader
range of non-testimonial hearsay routinely admitted under ―firmly rooted
exceptions to the hearsay rule‖—the Court‘s analysis is undoubtedly
correct. 453 This analysis, however, ignores the very difficult subset of
testimonial hearsay that involves uncrossed accomplice statements to police.
Thus, it is somewhat unfortunate for proponents of retroactivity that the
determination as to Crawford was made on the basis of far less threatening
hearsay of the type considered in Bockting, rather than in the context of a
comparable fact situation in which the hearsay involved an accomplice‘s
confession to police. In this respect, the New Mexico court‘s approach in
Forbes serves the interests of justice far better than might have been
anticipated because it affords relief based upon the dual considerations of fair
notice as to the rules of admission of evidence at the time of trial and the
actual prejudice to a defendant whose conviction rests on evidence ultimately
repudiated by the Supreme Court. However, Forbes was never addressed by
the Bockting Court at all,454 perhaps because it represented creative judicial
decision making not accommodated by the Teague framework. Ironically,
Teague has come to dominate this central aspect of the Court‘s constitutional
criminal jurisprudence while resting only on a plurality opinion. 455
In explaining the grant of certiorari, Justice Alito looked to the conflicting
positions taken by the Ninth Circuit and ―every other Court of Appeals and
State Supreme Court that has addressed this issue.‖ 456 The Court inexplicably
ignored the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s decision in Forbes, in which
Crawford was afforded retroactive effect.457 This omission may well have
been inadvertent, but the fact that the decision in Forbes was published and
that the New Mexico attorney general applied for certiorari to review the state
court‘s decision458 would suggest that the omission was, in fact, deliberate.

453. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134.
454. See generally Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173.
455. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Justice O‘Connor wrote the Court‘s opinion,
which was joined by only three other Justices.
456. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1180 n.4.
457. In a similar vein of irony, the Crawford Court never addressed the order vacating
Earnest‘s conviction in New Mexico v. Earnest nor Justice Rehnquist‘s concurring statement in that
case. New Mexicans frequently complain that the state is often not recognized as a part of the United
States, and New Mexico Magazine has carried a column titled ―One of Our Fifty is Missing‖ for
years.
See generally One of Our 50 Is Missing, N.M. MAGAZINE, available at
http://www.nmmagazine.com/50missing.php. Perhaps this explains the Court‘s lack of recognition
of the Earnest litigation.
458. See New Mexico v. Forbes, 127 S. Ct. 1482 (2007) (denying New Mexico‘s petition for
writ of certiorari). The case was circulated within the U.S. Supreme Court for conference three times
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Moreover, the State‘s petition was not disposed of in routine fashion; instead,
the case was carried on the docket until the Court issued its decision in
Bockting, despite the fact that the issue presented had been rendered moot 459
when the charges against Earnest were dismissed in September 2006.460
The Court‘s treatment of the attorney general‘s petition in Forbes suggests
that the state supreme court‘s judgment would have been vacated and the case
remanded for reconsideration in light of Whorton v. Bockting once the
decision in Bockting had been entered. Earnest escaped this possible result,
which would have been the second time the Supreme Court would have
vacated relief afforded him by the New Mexico Supreme Court, by
successfully objecting to the State‘s motion to recall the mandate. 461 When
that court declined to recall its mandate, 462 the case was returned to the district
court‘s trial docket.463 Later, when the case was called for trial—before the
Supreme Court acted on the pending certiorari petition—the State was unable
to announce ready for trial because Boeglin refused to testify, accepting a
contempt finding by the trial court rather than taking the stand. 464
B. Danforth v. Minnesota and the Final Piece of the Retroactivity Puzzle:
Recognition of State Court Discretion in Expanding upon Teague in
Retroactive Application of New Rules
Bockting declared that Crawford constituted a new rule not retroactively
applicable to benefit defendants in either state or federal proceedings whose
trials had included prosecution reliance on uncrossed, testimonial
statements.465 But the question left unresolved there has now been answered
in Danforth v. Minnesota.466 Following Danforth, state courts are free to give
retroactive effect to Crawford and other decisions of the Court announcing
after Earnest filed his Brief in Opposition.
459. Earnest filed a Suggestion of Mootness on October 17, 2006, based on dismissal of the
charges that were pending on remand from the state supreme court as a result of its decision granting
relief from his conviction. Nevertheless, the case was carried on the Court‘s docket until the State‘s
petition was denied on March 5, 2007, after the case was again distributed for the Court‘s March 2nd
conference.
Order List of Summary Dispositions (Mar. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/030507pzor.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). The
Court issued its opinion in Bockting on February 28, 2007. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1173.
460. Audio tape: Pre-Trial Proceedings, State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist.
Ct. Sept. 5, 2006) (on file with author).
461. New Mexico v. Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Sept. 21, 2005) (order denying motion to recall
mandate); Mandate No. 29,111 (N.M. Aug. 26, 2005).
462. New Mexico v. Forbes, No. 29,111 (N.M. Nov. 22, 2005) (order denying renewed motion
to recall mandate).
463. Mandate No. 29,111 (N.M. Aug. 26, 2005).
464. Audio tape: Pre-Trial Proceedings, supra note 460.
465. See Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1181–84 (2007).
466. 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).
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new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure, consistent with their
own retroactivity doctrines.467
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Danforth, put the question
succinctly and then answered it directly: ―The question in this case is whether
Teague constrains the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new
rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. We have never
suggested that it does, and now hold that it does not.‖468 Thus, the Teague
new rules doctrine does not reach beyond basic principles of federalism to bar
states from determining that federal constitutional protections should be
applied retroactively, consistent with state law principles. 469
1. Danforth‘s Claim in the State Courts
Danforth argued in his post-conviction claim in the Minnesota courts that
Crawford should be applied retroactively to afford him relief from his
conviction obtained, in part, on the admission of a videotaped interview of the
complainant in a child sexual assault case.470 The taped interview included a
description of the assault by the complainant, a six-year-old boy found
incompetent to testify by the trial court due to his inability to respond to
questioning, as well as his five-year-old sister, whom the court did find
competent to testify to events involving her brother and the accused. 471
The trial court admitted the videotape, finding that it bore sufficient
indicia of reliability to warrant admission, including the fact that the child‘s
statements ―appeared spontaneous and largely unsolicited by leading
questions‖ and that the complainant ―lacked any apparent motivation to
fabricate the accusation.‖472 The appellate court agreed with this assessment,
noting that Minnesota applied the Idaho v. Wright formula for determining
reliability—a showing of ―particularized guarantees of trustworthiness‖ 473—
when determining whether an out-of-court statement is admissible in the
absence of cross-examination.474 Of course, this is the same test articulated in
Ohio v. Roberts.475

467. See id. at 1033.
468. Id.
469. The majority rejected the position taken by the dissent that the articulation of principles of
federal constitutional criminal procedure is a matter of the Court‘s discretion, binding on the states
through the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 1048 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Kennedy, J., dissenting).
470. Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d 530, 530–31 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
471. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
472. Id.
473. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815 (1990).
474. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 375.
475. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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Danforth could have logically argued that Crawford had repudiated the
application of the ―particularlized guarantees of trustworthiness‖ test for
admission of the videotaped interview, rather than deposition, of his child
accuser in the sense that the interview itself was made with a clear eye toward
its use in litigation. In fact, the recorded interview was made in accordance
with a Minnesota statute expressly authorizing the admission of this type of
interview in evidence, 476 as the court itself noted.477 The state supreme court
denied review, 478 and Danforth‘s initial round of post-conviction litigation
was unsuccessful.
However, after the Court issued its decision in Crawford, Danforth again
applied for state post-conviction relief, arguing retroactive application of
Crawford as a basis for setting aside his conviction. 479 The Minnesota Court
of Appeals denied relief, holding that Crawford announced a new rule and
one not subject to Teague‘s exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity.480 That court also concluded that the approaches taken by all
federal circuits other than the Ninth in Bockting v. Bayer were more
persuasive on the question of whether Crawford fit within one of the Teague
exceptions.481
The Minnesota Supreme Court then addressed the issue of Crawford
retroactivity decided adversely to Danforth by the intermediate court. 482
Danforth argued that regardless of whether Crawford applied retroactively as
a matter of due process because it announced a new rule fitting within either
of the Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity, the state courts were free to
apply Supreme Court precedent retroactively. 483 The supreme court rejected
Danforth‘s argument,484 relying on its decision in State v. Houston485 where
the court had held that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Blakely v.
Washington486 could not be applied retroactively absent an express declaration
requiring retroactive application by the United States Supreme Court.487 The
476. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (2008).
477. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 375.
478. Id. at 369 (noting review denied by Minnesota Supreme Court on February 19, 1998).
479. Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
480. Id. at 532.
481. Id.
482. See Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Minn. 2006).
483. Id. at 455. The court observed that Danforth raised the question of the state court‘s
authority to apply Crawford retroactively despite the fact that it would not qualify for retroactive
application under Teague for the first time in his appeal to the state supreme court. Id. Nevertheless,
the court addressed the issue ―in the interests of justice.‖ Id.
484. Id.
485. 702 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2005).
486. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
487. See Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 274.
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Houston court, however, did not hold that Teague forbids retroactive
application of federal constitutional new rules by state courts.488 Instead, the
court rejected the arguments that the limitations imposed upon sentencing
discretion by Blakely489 fit within Teague‘s exceptions.490
The Minnesota Supreme Court in O’Meara v. State had articulated its
understanding of the mandatory nature of Teague when dealing with the duty
to apply federal constitutional new rules announced by the United States
Supreme Court.491 But the court there did not address the question ultimately
raised by Danforth: whether Minnesota courts could apply a new rule
retroactively as a matter of state law or policy when the Supreme Court did
not expressly provide for retroactive application as a matter of federal due
process.492 It did, however, hold that because O‘Meara‘s case was not final
when the Court‘s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey493 was announced, he
would be entitled to the benefit of that holding based on the requirement that
even new rules are applicable to issues raised in pending litigation not final at
the time the Court announces its decision.494 It also made an interesting
observation that would later prove somewhat ironic in the context of
Danforth: ―It is axiomatic that as Minnesota‘s highest court we determine
whether our decisions on state law are given retroactive or prospective
effect.‖495 It did so, explaining its own doctrine of retroactivity for state law
decisions that parallels the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Griffith v.
Kentucky.496
What is clear is that the Minnesota Supreme Court could have based its
rejection of Danforth‘s claim by electing to apply a state retroactivity rule
paralleling Teague. In fact, a substantial number of jurisdictions had done
precisely that, adopting Teague as the formula for retroactivity analysis under
state law, although apparently conceding that Teague is not mandatory. 497
488. See id. at 271–74.
489. Blakely held that enhanced sentences based upon particular circumstances require
pleading and proof of those factors warranting increased sentences by the trier of fact, applying the
principle of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), to certain sentencing discretion
traditionally exercised by trial judges within statutory frameworks. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
490. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 271–74.
491. 679 N.W.2d 334, 339–40 (Minn. 2004).
492. See id. at 338–40.
493. 530 U.S. at 490.
494. O’Meara, 679 N.W.2d at 340.
495. Id. at 338.
496. See id. at 338–39 (referring to Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)).
497. See, e.g., Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 981–82 (Colo. 2006) (recognizing the
possibility that Teague does not bind the states, then circumventing the problem by deciding as a
matter of state law to apply the Teague rule); People v. Flowers, 561 N.E.2d 674, 682 (Ill. 1990)
(adopting Teague as a matter of state law); Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 81–82 (Iowa 1989)
(same); State v. Tallard, 816 A.2d 977, 979–81 (N.H. 2003) (also recognizing the possibility that
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Had the court taken this approach, Danforth‘s petition would not have raised a
federal constitutional claim warranting review by the Court.
Instead, however, the Minnesota court framed its decision in terms of
limitation on its own authority, 498 squarely raising an issue of federalism. The
court‘s approach was consistent with the position taken by other state courts
holding that they were bound by Teague‘s retroactivity principles and barred
from affording relief to state court inmates whose convictions were final
based on Supreme Court decisions announcing new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure499 or that have deferred to Teague as controlling. 500 The
Danforth Court noted, however, that other state courts had not considered
state retroactivity principles to be controlled by Teague.501
2. The Supreme Court‘s Disposition of Danforth‘s Claim
The Supreme Court rejected the state supreme court‘s analysis in
providing Danforth with an initial victory in his pursuit of relief from
conviction through retroactive application of Crawford‘s restored
commitment to cross-examination.502 Instead, the majority rejected the
argument that federal due process requires a nationally consistent application
Teague does not bind the states, then circumventing the problem by deciding as a matter of state law
to apply the Teague rule).
498. See Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 455–56 (Minn. 2006).
499. E.g., State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 267 (Mont. 1995); Page v. Palmateer, 84 P.3d 133,
137–38 (Or. 2004) (holding state court was not ―free to determine the degree to which a new rule of
federal constitutional law should be applied retroactively‖); State v. Gómez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 650–
51 (Tenn. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 1209 (2007).
500. E.g., Johnson v. Warden, 591 A.2d 407, 410 (Conn. 1991); Whisler v. State, 36 P.3d 290,
296 (Kan. 2001); People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 464–65 (N.Y. 1995); Agee v. Russell, 751
N.E.2d 1043, 1046–47 (Ohio 2001); Thomas v. State, 888 P.2d 522, 527 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 780 (Pa. 2004); Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 679 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000).
501. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008) (citing State v. Preciose, 609 A.2d
1280, 1292 (N.J. 1992) (explaining that comity and federalism concerns ―simply do not apply when
this Court reviews procedural rulings by our lower courts‖)); id. at 1042 (stating that ―for many years
following Teague, state courts almost universally understood the Teague rule as binding only federal
habeas courts, not state courts‖) (citing Preciose, 609 A.2d 1280; Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d
514 (S.D. 1990); State v. Murphy, 548 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Wis. 1996) (choosing of its own volition to
adopt Teague)). The Court also noted commentary arguing that Teague should not be considered
binding on state retroactivity doctrines. Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1042 (citing Mary C. Hutton,
Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA.
L. REV. 421, 422–24 (1993)). Professor Hutton argued that ―Teague‘s foundation is statutory and
prudential; it is not constitutional. Moreover, its restrictions apply only to federal habeas cases,
leaving states the opportunity to follow Teague or to develop an approach to retroactivity which
enables them to fulfill the requirements of their state constitutions, statutes, and case law.‖ Hutton,
supra, at 423–24 (footnotes omitted). Professor Hutton‘s perceptive analysis was affirmed by the
Court‘s disposition and reasoning fifteen years later in Danforth. See generally Danforth, 128 S. Ct.
1029.
502. See Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1046–47.
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of retroactivity principles with regard to newly announced interpretations of
constitutional protections.503 However, the Court certainly did not ensure that
Minnesota would adopt the broader doctrine of retroactivity for its decisions
that its holding in Danforth permits, precisely because the majority‘s holding
affords Minnesota and all other states the option of formulating or applying
retroactivity doctrines that deviate from the Court‘s retroactivity doctrine
articulated in Teague.
Thus, having freed state courts from the constraint of mandatory
application of the Teague retroactivity principle as a rule binding on states and
applied to limit their discretion to afford broader retroactivity than that
ordered by the Court when appropriate under the Teague exceptions, the issue
facing state courts following Danforth is twofold. First, state courts remain
free to fashion their retroactivity doctrines to conform strictly to Teague and
may now elect to do so. And second, if they elect to do so, they must decide
what principles may guide them in the exercise of the discretion afforded by
Danforth.
The Danforth Court‘s rejection of the Minnesota court‘s conclusion that
Teague limited its authority to apply Crawford retroactively effectively opens
the door for state courts to determine when state inmates whose convictions
are final may benefit from newly announced rules of constitutional criminal
procedure. 504 It also permits state courts to fashion retroactivity doctrines that
may recognize limited retroactivity based on factors viewed as critical in the
determination of whether retroactive application of a new rule is necessary to
achieve justice, much as the New Mexico Supreme Court did in affording
Earnest relief in Forbes.505

503. See id. at 1033.
504. This result in Danforth is consistent with the position advocated by a number of states
joining in the filing of an amicus brief in the case. See Brief of Kansas and the Amici States in
Support of Neither Party at 3, Danforth, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (No. 06-8273), 2007 WL 2088650, where
their attorneys general took the position that Teague does not control state retroactivity doctrine:
There is no constitutional command that the States follow federal habeas corpus
doctrines such as the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989). Nor is there a constitutional bar to the States developing their own
retroactivity doctrines for state post-conviction proceedings, whether those
doctrines are broader or stricter than a federal habeas counterpart such as
Teague. So long as state courts make that decision as a matter of state law,
there is no federal interest nor federal constitutional principle at stake (italics
added).
505. See supra Part IV.B.3 for a discussion of the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s retroactivity
analysis applied in State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005).
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3. The New Mexico Supreme Court‘s Approach in Earnest
While the New Mexico Supreme Court afforded Earnest relief based on its
reading of the confrontation principle affirmed in Crawford, it did not adopt a
general retroactive application approach to Crawford claims in state cases. 506
Instead, it fashioned a ruling based upon limited retroactivity, rather than
formulating a general rule applicable to all Crawford claims.507 Arguably, in
doing so, the court intended that only Earnest among all New Mexico litigants
would ever benefit from this ruling. Of course, the holding itself left the court
the option of extending the benefit of this approach to any other similarly
situated state defendant. Thus, another New Mexico defendant who is able to
show that counsel had relied on Douglas v. Alabama at trial in objecting to the
admission of a non-testifying accomplice‘s confession never subjected to
testing by cross-examination would presumably be permitted to claim Forbes
as precedent in a state post-conviction action. However, there may simply be
no similarly situated defendant for whom relief would be available.
Danforth leaves open the option for state courts to fashion limited, rather
than general, rules of retroactivity. For example, a state court might hold that
only certain classes of statements, such as accomplice confessions, would be
considered for retroactive application of Crawford because other hearsay
declarations do not pose such a serious potential for falsity based upon the
declarant‘s self-interest. Similarly, even if a class of statements might be
subject to retroactive application of Crawford‘s cross-examination
requirement, a state court might elect to limit those circumstances in which
relief is granted, as most claims of constitutional error are subject to harm
analysis.508
A number of circumstances defined the New Mexico court‘s approach in
applying Crawford retroactively for Earnest‘s benefit. First, the court did not
elect to apply Crawford retroactively in all cases in which ―testimonial

506. See Forbes, 119 P.3d at 148.
507. See id.
508. Some constitutional claims involve matters of structural error that cannot be subjected to
analysis for harm precisely because harm cannot be assessed in light of the trial record. For instance,
claims of improper exclusion of jurors based on ethnicity, see generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986), or attitudes toward capital punishment, see generally Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968), are not susceptible to prejudice analysis because it is impossible to accurately assess
the behavior of a jury had the excluded juror been seated and served. Similarly, in Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the Court held that a constitutionally defective jury instruction that
impermissibly altered the burden of proof imposed upon the prosecution in a criminal case
constituted ―structural error‖ not amenable to prejudice analysis. Any attempt to assess harm would
require speculation on consequences of the error that would be ―unquantifiable and indeterminate.‖
Id. at 281–82. Trial error claims, or those that occur ―during the presentation of the case to the jury,
and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented,‖ are
evaluated in terms of prejudice to the accused. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991).
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hearsay‖ had been admitted without cross-examination, restricting its
application to Earnest‘s case.509 A state court could clearly fashion relief in
this way, or by affording retroactive application only to convictions resting on
inherently suspect testimonial statements given by accomplices. Second, the
claimed confrontation violation in the denial of cross-examination was clearly
asserted at trial and in all subsequent proceedings in the state and federal
courts.510 And third, as the state supreme court concluded in its initial
decision reversing the conviction, Boeglin‘s statement was prejudicial,
particularly because it was the only evidence the prosecution had linking
Earnest to the Eastman murder.511
The analysis in Earnest thus fits within reasonable parameters for
retroactive application of Crawford. Where the conviction itself rests on
evidence that would be excluded were the new rule articulated in a decision of
the Supreme Court, as in Earnest, a state court could reasonably fashion a
limited remedy designed to correct the manifest injustice inherent in the
conviction as a matter of state law. That formulation would be insulated from
federal constitutional attack in light of Danforth.
In Forbes, the New Mexico court noted two compelling considerations
supporting its decision to afford Earnest the retroactive benefit of Crawford.
First, the court had already determined that the admission of Boeglin‘s
confession had been found to be prejudicial in the original direct appeal. 512
Second, the court found the fact that at the time of Earnest‘s trial, Douglas v.
Alabama was the controlling Supreme Court precedent, relied upon by
Earnest‘s trial counsel and on his direct appeal.513 Only when the Supreme
Court vacated the state court‘s reversal of Earnest‘s conviction was that rule
governing admission of co-defendant confessions undermined, influenced
strongly by Justice Rehnquist‘s concurring opinion. 514 Thus, the rules for trial
changed after the fact and without any possibility for trial counsel to have
advised Earnest and represented him at trial with reasonable knowledge that
he could not rely on Douglas in the preparation of the defense.
The decision in Forbes represents a reasonable alternative for state courts
concerned that new constitutional doctrine undermines the credibility of state
court convictions obtained under now-discarded precedent. Where the
conviction itself appears to have been undermined by the recognition of a new
509. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 145.
510. The Forbes court noted: ―To aid our analysis, it is significant that Earnest preserved his
argument that admission of the accomplice statement to police officers without him having the
benefit of cross-examination violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers.‖ Id. at 147.
511. State v. Earnest (Earnest I), 703 P.2d 872, 876 (N.M. 1985).
512. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146 (citing Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 876).
513. Id. at 147.
514. Id.
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rule articulated by the Supreme Court, nothing would appear to bar a state
court from granting relief for those defendants for whom relief is deemed
appropriate, regardless of whether the state is free to apply federal
constitutional decisions retroactively. In fact, given the choice between an
absolute policy of nonretroactivity or the freedom to fashion retroactivity
doctrine that would require uniform retroactive application of new rules as a
matter of state process, state courts might well prefer the New Mexico
approach. Review of prior convictions called into question by new rules of
federal constitutional criminal procedure and a prejudice or harm assessment
of the implication of the new rule for the underlying conviction itself would
afford state courts the freedom to ―do justice to each litigant on the merits of
his own case.‖515
VI. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST
In one of the earliest post-Douglas decisions of the Court addressing the
confrontation right, California v. Green,516 Justice White succinctly described
the significance of cross-examination in the context of admission of a
declarant‘s out-of-court statements for purposes of impeachment:
Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude
that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a
declarant‘s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is
testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective crossexamination.
This conclusion is supported by comparing the
purposes of confrontation with the alleged dangers in
admitting an out-of-court statement. Confrontation: (1)
insures that the witness will give his statements under oath—
thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and
guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for
perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
the ―greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth‖; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant‘s
fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. 517
This endorsement of cross-examination as the primary tool available to
the accused to test the prosecution‘s case in the course of trial underlies the
515. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
516. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
517. Id. at 158 (footnote omitted).
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Crawford Court‘s recommitment to the ―greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth,‖ in the words of Dean Wigmore, 518 quoted by
Justice White. 519
Earnest‘s relief from his twenty-four-year-old murder conviction is
something of a testament to the inherent value of judicial review as a means of
correcting error in interpretation and application of law. On the other hand,
he spent a considerable period of his life waiting for the vindication that
ultimately came with the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s willingness to fashion
a rule drawing from both the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Crawford and its
own innate concern for fundamental fairness. 520
Danforth confirms the New Mexico court‘s exercise of discretion as valid
in constitutional terms in applying Crawford retroactively as a matter of state
retroactivity doctrine or policy. Other state courts may well decide to follow
the lead of the Forbes court in light of Danforth, but it is far from clear that
many state defendants will actually benefit from the liberality of the Court‘s
affirmation of judicial federalism in Danforth. The Minnesota Supreme Court
may opt to apply Teague‘s retroactivity approach on remand as the Danforth
Court itself noted in remanding: ―[T]he Minnesota Court is free to reinstate its
judgment disposing of the petition for state postconviction relief.‖521
Clearly, in the wake of Danforth, state courts will address applications for
post-conviction relief arguing for retroactive application of Crawford and
other favorable decisions of the United States Supreme Court announcing
new, but not retroactive, rules of constitutional criminal procedure. Although
the Court‘s holding in Danforth will necessarily make assertion of claims
based on those attractive to state inmates, it is not unreasonable to assume that
state courts will generally be unresponsive, or at least cautious, about
expanding the scope of post-conviction litigation. The New Mexico court‘s
approach in the Earnest litigation will likely prove instructive. The state court
did not apply Crawford retroactively for the benefit of New Mexico

518. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (rev. ed. 1974).
519. Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
520. The state supreme court‘s clear perception of its role in advancing the interest of justice
has been demonstrated in the development of state law doctrines that recognize the authority of the
court to exercise flexibility in discretion in fashioning relief when warranted by the facts of
individual cases. See, e.g., State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 792, 797 (N.M. 1996) (asserting authority to
impose bar to successive prosecutions necessitated by prosecutorial misconduct). Similarly, the New
Mexico courts have evidenced a willingness to adopt broader interpretations of rights accorded as a
matter of state constitutional law than those afforded by federal protections. See generally State v.
Gomez, 932 P.2d 1 (N.M. 1997) (construing search and seizure rights under the New Mexico
Constitution). New Mexico also recognizes fundamental and plain error doctrines. See State v.
Orosco, 833 P.2d 1146, 1150 (N.M. 1992).
521. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1047 (2008).
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defendants.522 Rather, it grounded its holding in the concept of fairness in
terms of notice of controlling law at the time of trial.523 Thus far, apparently

522. See State v. Forbes ex rel. Earnest, 119 P.3d 144, 148 (N.M. 2005).
523. See id. at 147–49.
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only Earnest, whose lawyers had preserved error at trial and consistently
argued for cross-examination in the appellate and post-conviction processes,
has received the benefit of Crawford for relief from his state court conviction.
And, it is not unlikely that he alone will ever be afforded such relief.

